Mass deportation is often touted as a boon for the American worker. The argument suggests that by removing unauthorized immigrants, the labor supply shrinks, leading to higher wages for native workers. This notion is not only intuitive and appealing but also economically simplistic.
In reality, mass deportation represents a significant intervention in labor markets. When we analyze it through the concepts of production complementarities and historical data, mass deportation reveals itself not as a pathway to higher wages but as a detrimental economic shock. This shock diminishes output, inflates prices, and ultimately leaves the majority of American workers in a worse position.
Current policy proposals aim to remove about 11 million unauthorized immigrants, with approximately 8.5 to 10.8 million actively participating in the labor force. The sheer scale of these proposals sets them apart from previous enforcement strategies. Economic models from both the American Immigration Council and the Penn Wharton Budget Model estimate that such a mass removal would lead to a decrease in U.S. GDP by 2.6 to 6.8%, losses akin to or surpassing those experienced during the Great Recession. These figures are not mere theoretical constructs; they reflect real disruptions in industries where unauthorized workers play a critical role.
From a fundamental standpoint, forcibly expelling 8 to 10 million predominantly prime-age workers results in a negative labor supply shock. This contraction leads to fewer hours worked and diminished productive capacity, driving up prices in sectors where labor cannot be swiftly replaced. It also dismantles the specialized capital and synergies that make these workers particularly productive. Given that unauthorized immigrants are heavily concentrated in labor-intensive sectors that are difficult to automate, the loss in output is not easily compensated by increasing capital investments or utilizing native labor. Consequently, the burden falls on consumers facing higher prices, complementary workers with diminished real wages, and business owners dealing with reduced profits.
We’re already witnessing these effects in sectors like construction and agriculture. In construction, unauthorized workers constitute approximately 19% of the labor force, with more than 30% in trades such as roofing, drywall, and concrete. Removing around 1.5 million of these workers—about 14% of the sector’s workforce—would slow down projects and increase building costs. In agriculture, unauthorized labor accounts for nearly a quarter of the national farm workforce, rising to a third in roles related to harvesting and sorting. Deporting these workers could eliminate up to 225,000 agricultural jobs, decrease output, and escalate food prices. Some models predict food price inflation could soar by nearly 9% under large-scale deportation scenarios. The hospitality, childcare, cleaning, and food service industries could collectively lose close to one million workers. Given the physically demanding and irregular nature of these roles, employers typically find it challenging to replace immigrant workers with native labor at acceptable wage levels.
Historical evidence further supports these projections. The Secure Communities program, which expanded from 2008 to 2013, intensified deportations in various areas. Research from that time indicates that increased deportations led to a decrease in construction activities and a 5 to 10% rise in housing prices in affected regions, with no lasting wage benefits for native workers. The temporary shortage of labor did not equate to sustainable improvements in worker welfare; rather, it resulted in lower output and higher costs.
Proponents of mass deportation often concede these disruptions but argue that native workers will eventually benefit through higher wages. In the short term, some low-skilled native workers may experience slight wage increases, typically around 1 to 3%. However, these gains are both modest and fleeting. Companies typically respond to labor shortages not by continuously raising wages but by cutting hours, reducing output, automating processes, or even shutting down altogether. As production declines, labor demand diminishes, nullifying any initial wage increases.
Conversely, higher-skilled workers—who comprise approximately two-thirds of the U.S. labor force—are likely to face clear losses. Since low-skilled and high-skilled labor are complementary in production, removing workers at the lower end of the skill spectrum diminishes the productivity of those at the top. The Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates that following mass deportation, long-term wage declines for higher-skilled workers could range from 0.5 to 2.8%. These losses, being less visible and more diffuse, are politically easier to overlook.
The fiscal repercussions further exacerbate the situation. According to the Baker Institute, the initial cost of mass deportation could exceed $315 billion, with ongoing enforcement expenses nearing $88 billion per year. Such a policy would necessitate a significant expansion of federal enforcement capabilities, potentially adding hundreds of thousands of new agents. Taxpayers would shoulder these costs without any corresponding increase in productive capacity.
Moreover, deportation would eliminate substantial tax revenue. Unauthorized immigrants contribute roughly $46.8 billion annually in federal taxes and $29.3 billion in state and local taxes, including payroll taxes that support Social Security and Medicare. Removing these contributors would exacerbate long-term fiscal challenges rather than alleviate them.
The social ramifications are equally significant. More than five million U.S. citizen children live in households with at least one unauthorized parent. Deportation often results in halving household income overnight, destabilizing families and increasing reliance on public assistance. These downstream costs seldom appear in the rhetoric surrounding enforcement-first policies, yet they are real and persistent.
The political allure of mass deportation lies in its visibility. Raids, removals, and enforcement statistics provide clear indicators of action. Economically, however, deportation operates much like a cartel—restricting labor supply to benefit a select few while imposing widespread costs on consumers, taxpayers, and complementary workers. Property owners do not hold a monopoly on physically demanding jobs, nor does excluding immigrants automatically reassign those jobs to native workers with higher productivity.
Labor markets function through specialization and price signals. Immigrant workers often specialize in tasks that complement native labor, enabling firms to expand output and allowing natives to transition into supervisory, technical, and customer-facing roles. Deportation disrupts this cooperative dynamic, substituting collaboration with coercion. As a result, the economic pie shrinks, making it impossible to simply redistribute jobs and wages more equitably.
If the aim is genuinely to elevate wages and foster lasting prosperity, a more productive solution is clear and aligns with fundamental economic principles. We should expand legal work visas, price them transparently, and enforce contracts rather than resorting to deportations. This approach would treat migrant workers as legitimate market participants. By granting firms legal, tradable access to labor through visas, we can then enforce laws against wage theft, recruitment fraud, and safety violations without relying primarily on raids and deportations.
This strategy need not disregard concerns about border security. For instance, visa auctions could generate the resources necessary for maintaining an orderly border while enabling labor markets to thrive. Employment verification could occur after hiring, safeguarding property rights while discouraging exploitation.
In conclusion, mass deportation does not uplift American workers; rather, it diminishes their economic prospects—quietly, broadly, and predictably. A thriving economy grounded in voluntary exchange and secure property rights necessitates labor mobility, not enforced scarcity. If the goal is an abundance of homes, lower prices, and rising real wages, the evidence strongly advocates against deportation and in favor of legal, market-driven labor flows.
