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For decades, the military strategies employed by the United States in Latin America have relied heavily on varying iterations of counterinsurgency methods. From the Cold War to the aftermath of the Iraq War, the guiding principle has often been a misguided quest for “hearts and minds.”
However, in light of current geopolitical dynamics, it has become increasingly evident that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) must pivot to a more pragmatic approach. This necessitates a counter-subversion strategy that prioritizes a more tangible connection with the populace—what could be termed “stomachs and hands”—over the outdated idealism of winning hearts and minds.
Historically, the U.S. military has trained foreign forces with the belief that counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine was the bedrock of stability. This belief drew upon lessons learned during the Cold War and in conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan, where non-state actors engaged in drawn-out insurgencies against U.S. forces, all while the military dangled the promise of honorable assistance to win over local populations.
That strategy enjoyed some success for a time. Yet in Latin America, where cartels, former leftist guerrillas, and street gangs now wield significant power, the Pentagon’s persistence in applying an antiquated playbook has become a fundamental miscalculation.
This error not only empowers the very factions the U.S. seeks to counter but also fosters harmful incentives, yielding minimal strategic advantages for American interests. The adversaries in Latin America do not resemble the insurgents of Iraq or Afghanistan, nor do they share ideological motivations. Instead, they manifest as intricate, transnational criminal networks fueled by drug trafficking, state corruption, and foreign influence—most notably from actors like China, Russia, and Iran.
In essence, the U.S. is not engaged in a traditional counterinsurgency war in Latin America; it is embroiled in a broader subversion war. And alarmingly, it lacks the necessary doctrine to navigate this complex battleground.
The Shortcomings of COIN in Latin America
COIN doctrine was originally intended for conflicts where insurgents aspire to govern. It presumes a clear enemy, a defined population, and a struggle for legitimacy. Yet in Latin America, cartels and criminal enterprises do not seek governance; they aim to corrupt and co-opt state power to serve their own financial interests. Historically, enemies aspired to govern; today’s adversaries strive for dominion without the burden of governance.
The U.S. military’s approach has been to train Latin American forces as though they were combating the Taliban. Yet the reality is that many of these forces are deeply compromised—either by corruption or by direct ties to cartels and foreign intelligence agencies. American training often inadvertently empowers the very networks that counter U.S. interests.
As if that weren’t enough, the U.S. has failed to recognize the substantial external support these groups receive from countries like China and Russia, as well as from NGOs with their own agendas. By overlooking these dynamics, the U.S. has allowed anti-American influences to proliferate within allied forces and agencies in the region.
Furthermore, a thorough reevaluation of local advisors at U.S. embassies is urgently needed. Many are remnants of USAID or INL programs and come from failed globalist transitional justice initiatives in their respective countries. It is essential to vet and replace them with trustworthy new personnel.
By Mario Duarte.
This article was originally published on SOFREP Military Grade Content.
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