In his recent piece titled “Can a Constitution Limit the State?” published on July 21, 2025, co-blogger Pierre Lemieux raises a pivotal question that has preoccupied political theorists for centuries. In the comments section, I referenced a compelling paper in the Journal of Institutional Economics by Jacek Lewkowicz, Jan Falkowski, Zimin Lou, and Olga Marut (referred to as LFLM). This paper argues that the specific wording of a constitution significantly influences governmental adherence to its restrictions (“Watch out for Words: Wording of Constitution and Constitutional Compliance,” Journal of Institutional Economics, 20:e35).
The authors contend that a constitution’s readability—favoring straightforward language over technical jargon—can make it easier to identify violations by government officials. This clarity can, in turn, increase accountability from the electorate. On the flip side, a constitution that is overly technical may fall into the hands of a select few trained interpreters, complicating its enforcement. Thus, ensuring that the constitution (and subsequent laws) is accessible to the average citizen can yield significant advantages.
However, astute readers might recall my earlier post from April titled “Colloquial Law,” where I highlighted Lon Fuller’s critique of the Soviet legal approach aimed at simplifying laws to a level that every worker could grasp. The unintended consequence? A chaotic legal landscape devoid of consistency, where judicial application became “capricious and less predictable.” Ironically, this mirrors the pitfalls associated with overly intricate constitutions as well.
So, how do we reconcile this apparent contradiction? One possibility is that the relationship between readability and compliance is complex and non-linear. While a constitution’s clarity offers initial benefits, these advantages may diminish over time, eventually leading to negative net outcomes. This could also shed light on LFLM’s findings regarding the mixed results stemming from linguistic precision.
Additionally, it’s worth considering that other influential factors may overshadow readability. In a vast democracy like the United States, the capacity of any single voter—or even a singular representative or senator—to hold constitutional violators accountable is severely restricted. This is where classic collective action problems rear their heads. In contrast, smaller democracies might find themselves better positioned for effective enforcement.
There are myriad intriguing avenues to explore in answering this conundrum, and I’m certain that constitutional scholars have already delved into them. Ultimately, the efficacy of constitutions remains a critical issue worthy of ongoing examination.
