At least 8 locations in Cuba may be operating as Chinese espionage bases.

Recent developments indicate that China has significantly upgraded and expanded various signal interception stations in Cuba.

The deepening ties between Cuba and the People’s Republic of China in intelligence operations have sent ripples of concern through Washington. In 2023, U.S. officials explicitly acknowledged that Beijing was utilizing espionage facilities situated on the Caribbean island, a mere stone’s throw from Florida—less than 100 miles away.

Once the site of the massive Soviet Lourdes intelligence center during the Cold War, Cuba has now transformed into a sophisticated listening post for Chinese operations.

New evidence, bolstered by high-resolution satellite imagery, reveals that China has modernized and expanded several signals intelligence (SIGINT) stations in Cuba. These installations are strategically positioned to intercept sensitive U.S. military communications right on its doorstep, presenting an unprecedented strategic challenge reminiscent of the Missile Crisis era.

Classification of Chinese Espionage Sites in Cuba.

Utilizing open-source intelligence (OSINT), classified reports, and analyses from institutions like CSIS, it has been confirmed or is highly likely that at least eight sites are being utilized or prepared for SIGINT operations by China or with the support of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Below is a classification of these sites based on the level of verification:

Note: These classifications are derived from CSIS documentation (2024), Department of Defense reports, and public satellite observations.

Recruitment Mechanisms: Silent Infiltration.

Over the decades, China has employed sophisticated recruitment tactics to position agents within the U.S. government and military. Notable cases, such as Glenn Duffie Shriver—who was recruited while studying in China to apply to the CIA—and Ron Hansen, a former military intelligence officer sentenced in 2019 for attempting to relay classified information to China, underscore a long-term strategy of infiltration.

Historical figures also come into play, such as Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a CIA analyst recruited by China in the 1950s who passed secrets for nearly three decades. More recently, the case of Ambassador Víctor Manuel Rocha, who was infiltrated by Cuban intelligence for decades, raises grave concerns about the capabilities for human intelligence (HUMINT) collaboration between China and Cuba.

Internal and External Surveillance from Cuba.

The Cuban regime maintains its internal stability, bolstered by Chinese technology that enables it to anticipate dissent, monitor its populace, and quash protests before they gain momentum.

In this context, China establishes an advanced technical espionage hub against the U.S. without the need for overt military infrastructure, gaining privileged access to communications, satellites, and military bases situated in the southern United States.

Beijing’s presence in Cuba can be viewed as a strategic bargain: it offers technological support to the Cuban regime to maintain internal control while obtaining the operational leeway to conduct espionage activities from the island. This dual-purpose arrangement exemplifies the archetype of a “21st-century authoritarian alliance.”

Technological Platforms Used by the PRC and PLA.

Facilities in Bejucal, Calabazar, and El Salao demonstrate the deployment of CDAAs (circularly disposed antenna arrays) and parabolic antenna systems designed for signal interception. Notably, Bejucal has undergone expansion with a new CDAA added in 2024.

These infrastructures permit high-frequency signal triangulation, missile launch tracking, and surveillance of radar networks and military communications.

Additionally, companies such as Huawei and ZTE have played roles in developing Cuba’s telecommunications framework, raising legitimate concerns that these civilian platforms could be utilized for interception or cyber-intelligence operations.

Chinese Telecommunications Infrastructure in Cuba (Huawei, ZTE, and Others).

The following list outlines the primary communications facilities associated with Chinese firms (Huawei, ZTE, CEIEC) in Cuba, which may have applications in electronic intelligence, strategic monitoring, and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) support.

Note: Sources include CSIS, leaked technical reports, ETECSA bidding contracts, and OSINT analysis of networks and BTS towers. Most of these assets are either directly or indirectly linked to network infrastructure controlled by Chinese entities.

Chinese Surveillance Cameras in Cuba.

Technical Observation: These surveillance cameras are integrated into Huawei’s telecommunications networks, allowing centralized control from command centers operated by the Ministry of the Interior (MININT).

While these cameras are officially promoted as tools for “public safety,” their capabilities for real-time facial and behavioral analysis raise troubling concerns about their dual-use as both civil surveillance infrastructure and C4ISR support assets under foreign oversight.

Strategically located near key nodes (such as Bejucal, Calabazar, or the U.S. Embassy), these cameras may serve as real-time visual intelligence platforms, enhancing the Chinese SIGINT capabilities already identified on Cuban soil.

Policy Recommendations for the U.S.

• Enhance military and diplomatic cryptography, particularly for satellite communications and critical data links.
• Implement technical and cyber counterintelligence measures aimed at disrupting or misleading Chinese SIGINT systems based in Cuba.
• Engage in proactive diplomacy with Caribbean and Latin American nations to thwart the expansion of Chinese bases or similar collaborative efforts.
• Broaden FBI and Department of Defense counterintelligence initiatives, including internal awareness campaigns.