BREAKING: Did Russia and China Sever NATO Cables to Block an Attack and Delay World War 3?

By Unleashed News
By Guest Contributor Jason Sullivan at the Gateway Pundit | November 30, 2024

In a significant development with potential far-reaching implications for NATO’s strategic operations, two critical undersea communication cables in the Baltic Sea—vital for military coordination among NATO allies—have been deliberately severed, indicating a possible act of hybrid warfare. The timing of these incidents, occurring shortly after the approval for Ukraine to use U.S.-supplied ATACMS long-range missiles against Russian targets, suggests a coordinated effort by Russia, potentially in collaboration with China, to impede NATO’s ability to respond effectively during a crucial phase in the escalating conflict.

The cutting of these cables goes beyond mere sabotage; it could be a strategic geopolitical move intended to delay NATO’s escalation until the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump on January 20, 2025, known for his diplomatic approach and reluctance towards prolonged military engagements.

A Timeline Worthy of Attention

November 16, 2024: Authorization granted by the Biden administration for Ukraine to utilize long-range ATACMS missiles against Russian targets, signaling a significant escalation in U.S. involvement in the conflict.

November 17, 2024: The first of the two undersea cables, the BCS East-West Interlink connecting Lithuania and Sweden, is severed.

November 18, 2024: The C-Lion1 cable, linking Finland and Germany, is also cut.

The close succession of these events is highly suggestive. Within a span of 48 hours following the U.S. decision, NATO’s communication abilities in a strategically crucial region were severely disrupted.

Map by: TeleGeography. Notes by: Jason Sullivan

Suspect: Chinese Vessel Yi Peng 3

Enter the Chinese bulk carrier Yi Peng 3. Suspected to be anchored in international waters near the locations of both cable disruptions, this vessel is implicated in the incidents. It is believed that the ship’s substantial anchor, potentially weighing several tons, was intentionally dragged across the seabed, causing damage to these crucial cables.

Despite urgent appeals from Sweden, the vessel remains anchored without permission to enter Swedish waters for inspection. There has been no cooperation in allowing authorities to board the ship, heightening suspicions of China’s involvement in a possible coordinated act of sabotage alongside Russia.

Image by: VesselFinder

Disruption of NATO Coordination

The severance of the C-Lion1 and BCS East-West Interlink cables has left NATO dependent on slower and less secure backup systems, like satellite communications. These cables are not just civilian communication channels; they are the backbone of NATO’s instantaneous military coordination among its Nordic and Baltic partners. By cutting these cables, Russia and China may have achieved multiple strategic objectives:

Halting a Coordinated NATO Offensive:

The approval of ATACMS usage enabled Ukraine to target deeper into Russian territory with precision missiles, likely prompting Moscow to anticipate immediate escalation. By disrupting NATO’s capacity to coordinate long-range attacks and joint maneuvers, Russia has effectively bought time to regroup and respond without the imminent threat of synchronized NATO action.

Highlighting NATO’s Vulnerabilities:

This action underscores NATO’s reliance on undersea infrastructure and susceptibility to hybrid warfare tactics. The delay in restoring real-time communication between key member states such as Finland, Germany, Lithuania, and Sweden places NATO in a precarious position during this critical juncture.

Postponing Escalation until January 2025:

With President Donald Trump set to assume office in less than two months, Russia and China might view this as an opportunity to stall NATO’s military operations. Trump’s history of avoiding prolonged conflicts and advocating for diplomatic solutions could lead to a potential de-escalation in the new year, contrasting sharply with the escalation approach pursued under the Biden administration.

Significance of the Severed Cables

C-Lion1 (Finland-Germany): A high-capacity cable facilitating secure communications and data exchange between Nordic countries and NATO’s central command in Germany. This cable is crucial for military logistics and real-time decision-making.

BCS East-West Interlink (Lithuania-Sweden): Provides essential connectivity between the Baltic states and NATO-aligned Sweden, vital for regional security in an area bordering Russia.

The loss of these cables has hindered NATO’s ability to synchronize responses, share intelligence, and execute operations in the Baltic Sea, a region of significant strategic importance. For Russia, this presents a temporary but critical advantage.

Success of Deliberate Hybrid Warfare

The method employed—dragging a multi-ton anchor across undersea cables—may be basic but has proven effective. Given the anchor’s size and the shallow Baltic Sea waters, the likelihood of severing these cables was high. This was not a random occurrence but a calculated move to ensure maximum disruption.

Repair Timeline: Strategic Delay

Repairing such vital undersea cables is a complex task. Estimates suggest that complete restoration could take 6-8 weeks, extending the timeline to late January 2025 or beyond. During this period, NATO’s ability to counter Russian aggression remains severely compromised, leaving member states exposed and fragmented.

This delay serves the interests of Russia and China, providing them with a crucial window to solidify their positions and deter further escalation.

Conclusion: Strategic Timing at its Best

The severing of these undersea cables appears to be a calculated move in hybrid warfare, executed with precise timing and strategic intent. By disrupting NATO’s communications and coordination capabilities in the Baltic Sea, Russia and China have compelled the alliance to pause and reassess its vulnerabilities. This maneuver grants critical time for both nations—time to prevent further escalation until a potential Trump administration pivots U.S. foreign policy towards diplomacy rather than conflict.

While the authorization of ATACMS strikes by the Biden administration may have ignited the situation, the cutting of NATO’s essential infrastructure could potentially act as a deterrent to prevent further escalation—for the time being.