Since assuming leadership in 2012, Xi Jinping has launched an aggressive anti-corruption crusade, resulting in the prosecution of approximately 2.3 million government officials. While this campaign has successfully eliminated rivals, it has also led to a precarious situation within his own support network. Notably, Xi’s military purges have targeted over 50 high-ranking generals between 2014 and 2016, with more recent dismissals affecting half of the Central Military Commission (CMC), thereby consolidating his grip on power but simultaneously introducing instability among his backers.
The purged officials were often connected not to anti-Xi factions but to organizations like the Communist Youth League, which has historically been a stepping stone to power for many previous leaders—a connection that Xi himself lacks.
Under Xi’s rule, the CMC has dwindled to its smallest size in decades. Following the dismissal of Admiral Miao Hua, the commission is now down to just five members—the fewest since the era of Mao Zedong. General He Weidong, a vice-chairman, remains a mystery figure as he hasn’t been seen in state media since March, and if he is indeed inactive, the commission could be left with only four members. The traditional structure of the CMC typically includes seven members, consisting of Xi as Chairman, along with two Vice Chairmen, and four other members. The recent departures of Miao Hua and former Defense Minister Li Shangfu, combined with He Weidong’s uncertain status, signal a significant upheaval in China’s military leadership.
The implications of these military purges are profound, especially considering that many of the removed figures, including Miao, were previously viewed as loyal to Xi. Miao, who oversaw ideological conformity within the PLA, was suspended in November 2024 for “serious violations of discipline.” Similarly, General He, who was promoted rapidly to Vice Chairman in March 2023, has also found himself facing an anti-corruption investigation and has been absent from public view since April 2025.
Interestingly, Xi appointed these individuals to high-ranking positions after the 20th Party Congress in 2022, at a time when he was solidifying his authority just before embarking on his unprecedented third term. The fact that he is now purging his own appointees could suggest either rising internal dissent or an ongoing strategy to eliminate any potential threats to his authority.
Compounding the speculation over Xi’s leadership is the recent establishment of a new “Central Committee decision-making and coordination body” by the CCP Politburo. Some analysts interpret this move as Xi being compelled to share power, while others argue it could be a tactical maneuver to reinforce his control by placing loyalists in strategic positions. Additionally, the Politburo has issued an unusual warning against “overstepping boundaries,” which many interpret as a critique of Xi’s highly centralized approach to governance.
This comes on the heels of a June 30 meeting that emphasized “policy coordination,” hinting at potential underlying tensions. Since Xi took office in 2013, he has amassed unprecedented control over various key commissions, positioning himself as the most dominant Chinese leader since Mao. However, China’s ongoing economic troubles—rooted in the 2021 real estate crisis and exacerbated by U.S. tariffs—are starting to undermine confidence in his leadership.
At the same time, the ideological landscape may be shifting. In June 2025, a piece featuring Huawei founder Ren Zhengfei appeared on the front page of the People’s Daily, where he championed openness and market-oriented reforms. This article, titled “The More Open a Country Is, the More It Drives Us to Progress,” has raised eyebrows among observers, who speculate it could signal a resurgence of reformist economic ideas—though it is still unclear whether this reflects a genuine shift in Xi’s stance or is indicative of the influence of more liberal factions within the government.
Rumors of a “slow-motion coup” led by disgruntled party elites and former leaders have circulated among dissidents and exiles; however, tangible evidence remains elusive. While some suggest that Xi may be facing pressure from party elders like former President Hu Jintao, others contend that these rumors misinterpret the usual factional dynamics within the CCP.
The recent wave of purges impacting Xi’s own allies has created an air of uncertainty that may have weakened his support structure. Concurrently, Premier Li Qiang has begun to represent China at significant international gatherings, an unprecedented delegation of diplomatic responsibilities since Xi’s rise to power. This shift could indicate a potential alteration in power dynamics, with Xi either voluntarily stepping back from the international arena or doing so under mounting pressure.
Despite these challenges, Xi remains the most powerful leader China has seen since Mao, holding the titles of CCP General Secretary, State President, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Having secured a controversial third term in 2022 without naming a successor, all eyes are on the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session in August, where any signs of internal maneuvering could provide further insights into the future of Xi’s leadership.
