Intro. [Recording date: November 11, 2025.]
Russ Roberts: Today is November 11th, 2025, and I’m joined by William Easterly, a prominent economist and author, who is also Professor Emeritus of Economics at New York University. His latest work, Violent Saviors: The West’s Conquest of the Rest, is the focus of our discussion today.
This marks Bill’s fourth visit to the program; his last appearance was in June 2014—a considerable gap in time—where we delved into the tyranny of experts. Welcome back to EconTalk, Bill.
William Easterly: Thank you, Russ. It’s a pleasure to be back.
Russ Roberts: The essence of your book is beautifully encapsulated in its title, Violent Saviors, which appears almost contradictory. Typically, saviors are associated with peace and benevolence, while violence is something we generally seek to avoid. Can you explain why you chose this title and how it reflects the themes of your book?
William Easterly: Absolutely. A core theme of the book is how Western colonial conquests were often rationalized as missions to foster development in other parts of the world. The colonization of the Americas, Africa, and Asia was framed as a benevolent endeavor—essentially claiming, ‘We are here to save you.’ However, the reality is that such conquests were invariably violent, requiring the subjugation of local populations through military might. Thus, the term ‘violent saviors’ captures the paradox of colonizers who, while presenting themselves as benefactors, employed violence to enforce their version of salvation.
Russ Roberts: And how does this concept apply to contemporary paternalistic efforts aimed at improving the lives of those in the so-called “developing world”? You’ve been a significant voice in critiquing the aid industry and its methods of assisting these nations. While today’s approaches may lack the overt violence of colonialism, they still carry a savior complex. Do you remain skeptical of these initiatives?
William Easterly: Indeed, I have some thoughts on that. First, I want to clarify that I’m not equating modern development initiatives with the violent colonialism of the past—quite the opposite. The development landscape we see today, though not devoid of violence, is significantly less violent than during the colonial era.
I’m not equating mild forms of violence with the extreme brutality of the past. However, it’s essential to acknowledge that the liberal ideas that emerged during the colonial period—championed by thinkers like Adam Smith and later figures such as Amartya Sen—were partly responses to the experiences of violent saviors. Understanding these historical contexts can still offer valuable insights today, even if the extremes are not present in our current discussions.
Russ Roberts: You’re using ‘liberalism’ in its classical sense, advocating for liberty. We’ll explore that further, as it’s a crucial lens through which to view this discourse.
Russ Roberts: I’d like to share a quote from your book that I found particularly striking as it leads us into a deeper conversation about the concepts you discuss:
Agency is often seen as a rather arcane concern for people experiencing extreme deprivation. Aid agencies make some effort to recognize agency by deploying even more ponderous jargon like empowerment, community-driven development, participatory development, partnerships for development, country-led development, and consultations with stakeholders and civil society. It is hard to see how the intended beneficiaries of aid really get a voice from all this. Most development debaters turn with relief away from such buzzwords to seek lower poverty rates or a higher number of Christmas turkeys.
But is material poverty relief a reliable indicator that people will be better off if they have no agency to say so? Should poverty rates and GDP be the only measure of progress? [Italics original]
Let’s unpack the notion of agency. What does it signify to you, and why do you emphasize it in this context?
William Easterly: ‘Agency’ is a somewhat dry term that lacks emotional resonance. We don’t see protests demanding ‘agency’; instead, people rally for freedom, choice, and self-determination—terms laden with emotional weight.
However, I prefer ‘agency’ for its precision. The colonial encounter often presented a false choice: ‘Accept our rule for development, or remain stagnant.’ This essentially meant relinquishing one’s right to self-determination—what I refer to as agency.
In response, liberal thinkers, both historical and contemporary, have argued, ‘No, we desire more than mere relief from poverty; we want the right to chart our own futures.’ This sentiment emerged from the colonial legacy I explore throughout my book.
Ultimately, development does not grant conquerors the moral right to impose their will on others.
Russ Roberts: This analysis can be extended to other forms of coercive governance as well. For instance, the Communist Revolution, which claimed to uplift citizens in the Soviet Union, ultimately stripped them of agency and freedom. While some may argue that material conditions improved during certain periods, many lived in deprivation without the freedom to express dissent. This scenario exemplifies the worst of both worlds: poverty coupled with a lack of agency. Yet, there were those who viewed the revolution as a necessary evil—after all, ‘you have to break a few eggs to make an omelet.’ You argue, however, that we must question whether that ‘greater good’ indeed aligns with what people genuinely want.
William Easterly: Absolutely. The Soviet Union serves as a poignant case in point. While GDP might have seen rapid growth, the reality for citizens was often bleak. Their freedoms were severely curtailed through extreme measures, including widespread violence during the Russian Civil War and Stalin’s brutal policies.
When Western observers fixated on Soviet GDP growth as a sign of progress, they missed the broader reality—one that my book aims to address. We need a more comprehensive framework for evaluating progress, one that considers consent and the right to self-determination as essential components of well-being, just as they were during the colonial era.
Russ Roberts: You touch on the oppressive police state and the Gulag system, which epitomized the cruelty necessary to maintain Soviet authority.
Moreover, you rightly critique those who attempt to justify historical injustices like slavery in the United States by pointing to the material well-being of certain slaves, claiming that it somehow mitigates the horrors of slavery. This perspective is not only flawed but morally reprehensible.
William Easterly: The argument surrounding ‘benevolent slavery’ is crucial for liberal thinkers. Some have posited that the material conditions of slaves improved in certain contexts. However, the moral argument against slavery was not based on the material conditions alone; rather, it centered on the ethical implications of forcing individuals into bondage. If slave owners were so benevolent, why was it necessary to employ violence to maintain their system? As Abraham Lincoln pointedly remarked, if slavery is so good, why not impose it on oneself?
This recurring theme underscores the importance of choice and consent as the true measures of well-being, rather than relying on supposedly objective metrics like GDP or material wealth.
Russ Roberts: There has been a series of essays on the Library of Economics and Liberty regarding the contributions of economists to the anti-slavery movement, stemming from the work of David Levy and Sandra Peart, which you reference in your book.
William Easterly: Their work is significant in highlighting how economists played a pivotal role in advocating for human dignity.
Russ Roberts: Indeed, many who are now viewed positively in modern contexts supported slavery, while economists often opposed it. Thomas Carlyle dubbed economics the ‘dismal science’ not due to its equations but because it rejected the notion that some people are inherently inferior and deserving of subjugation. Economists argued against this view, asserting the shared dignity of all individuals. Can you elaborate on the role of economists in this moral discourse?
William Easterly: Carlyle’s advocacy for benevolent slavery faced fierce opposition from liberal thinkers like John Stuart Mill. Mill chose to confront the moral implications of slavery rather than engage in the material debates about income. He emphasized that the ethical considerations surrounding consent and choice should take precedence over mere economic arguments. This principle was echoed by modern thinkers like Amartya Sen, who questioned why individuals would flee from a supposedly beneficial system.
The crux of the argument is that we should not measure progress based solely on external metrics deemed beneficial by experts, but rather through the choices and voices of those directly impacted.
Russ Roberts: I’d like to return to the quote I mentioned earlier and focus on its latter part, as it invites broader reflection:
But is material poverty relief a reliable indicator that people will be better off if they have no agency to say so? Should poverty rates and GDP be the only measure of progress?
This reinforces the argument you made: agency matters, and consent is vital. People who escape from adverse situations clearly do not view them favorably.
Looking beyond slavery and colonization, how do you see the limits of material well-being as a measure of progress? There are many proposals for improving our understanding of what constitutes progress. For instance, the idea of Universal Basic Income often suggests that we can simply compensate for poverty with cash transfers without addressing underlying opportunities. What are your thoughts on this issue?
William Easterly: This line of thinking echoes the argument for benevolent autocracies, where dictators justify their rule by citing improved GDP or reduced poverty rates. However, it begs the question: Who decides what constitutes progress?
The assumption that development can be value-free ignores the reality that such judgments inherently reflect the values and priorities of those making the assessments. By focusing solely on measurable outcomes like poverty, we risk dismissing essential aspects of human dignity and autonomy.
This raises the critical issue of who gets to define what matters in development—an act fraught with moral implications.
Russ Roberts: Beyond material well-being, family dynamics are another important factor. Many individuals choose to remain in economically depressed areas because of familial ties and familiarity with their community’s norms. The notion that they are making a mistake by not relocating ignores the complexities of human relationships. Can you comment on this, and then I have a follow-up question.
William Easterly: One common criticism directed at impoverished communities is their spending on culturally significant events like weddings and funerals, which are often viewed as frivolous by outsiders. Critics argue that these funds would be better allocated to education or investment. However, we must question our right as external observers to dictate what should be prioritized. This overarching narrative of ‘deciding for them’ is troubling and often leads us astray.
Let’s consider whether this mindset is indeed misleading in more subtle scenarios today.
Russ Roberts: I once faced scrutiny when a reporter asked for my opinion on sending financial aid from the U.S. to improve education in an African country. I expressed my opposition—much to the reporter’s shock—arguing that if we struggle to effectively allocate funding in our own country, the hubris of assuming we could do so abroad is misplaced.
However, I also grapple with the idea that dismissing such initiatives might sometimes serve as an excuse for inaction. While it is true that individuals must ultimately take responsibility for their own futures, I worry that it may absolve me of the responsibility to help. What’s your perspective on this? Am I being too critical?
William Easterly: I also want to avoid the extreme of claiming that people should prioritize agency over material well-being. It’s crucial that we acknowledge both aspects. Material income and relief from dire conditions are undeniably important, and in acute cases, immediate material assistance may be the most pressing need.
However, we must also recognize the principle at play: Who are we—especially under the umbrella of ‘we’—to dictate what others should prioritize in their lives?
Russ Roberts: Let’s delve into a topic discussed in your book concerning Adam Smith and mercantilism. I’d like to read a passage that highlights some of your insightful observations. Mercantilism, which can be traced back to the 13th century, often resurfaces in discussions around trade policy. Critics of my reliance on classical economists like Smith or Ricardo frequently question the relevance of their ideas today, yet mercantilism—a flawed paradigm—persists. Here’s a quote from your work:
Mercantilist views are still around today, as if the object of policy should be to make everything at home. Smith’s original insight is as compelling as ever. If achieving trade surpluses is the goal, there is an unresolvable conflict between nations. If one nation is running a surplus, one or more other nations must be running a trade deficit. Mercantilism sees trade as a zero-sum game. Policymakers compete with each other to make their nation the one with the trade surplus by restricting imports. The competition will kill off international trade and both sides will be worse off.
Smith defined progress by what people wanted rather than by what the mercantilist experts said they should want. Trade “carries out” [Russ Roberts: and now you’re quoting Smith, I think–] Trade “carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land and labour for which there is no demand among them, and brings back in return for it something else for which there is a demand.” [Russ Roberts: Close quote from Adam Smith. You add–] The crucial word here is “demand.”
Which refers to what people want.
You also point out, which I found particularly striking:
Variations on the noun “choice” or verb “choose” occur forty-eight times in The Wealth of Nations, usually referring to individual choice. Smith mentions “consent” twenty-four times.
This emphasis on choice is compelling. Would you like to expand on this critique of mercantilism?
William Easterly: Certainly. There are two key points here. First, mercantilism exemplifies the pitfalls of relying on arbitrary indicators of progress that have little to do with genuine human desires. Secondly, Smith’s focus on consent and choice highlights a pathway toward mutual benefit rather than zero-sum competition.
Smith identified trade as a mechanism for achieving mutual consent, allowing individuals to freely engage in transactions that enhance their well-being. He lamented the colonial approach focused on conquest rather than trade, arguing that there were ample opportunities for mutually beneficial exchanges that could have uplifted all parties involved.
Russ Roberts: Smith’s writings in The Theory of Moral Sentiments reflect his respect for all humans, regardless of their societal status, often referring to them in ways that underscore their dignity.
Before we shift topics, I want to share a brief quote regarding Kant that made me chuckle:
Kant in his writings counterbalanced what it means to be human against violations of dignity: [Russ Roberts: Here’s the Kant quote:]
As a person (homo noumenon) he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in itself, that is, he possesses a dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world. [–Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals. Parentheses original to Easterly]
And you add:
Kant’s usually tortured syntax was not going to give him much of a future in the refrigerator magnet industry.
This humor is delightful. Would you like to elaborate on that?
William Easterly: I’m simply enjoying my own wit!
Russ Roberts: I want to discuss a significant aspect of the liberal movement, particularly the emphasis on freedom as an intrinsic value. You referenced earlier how thinkers like Mill approached the moral argument against slavery, focusing on the unethical nature of coercion itself, rather than debating whether slavery enhanced material well-being.
In recent times, I’ve observed a shift where this argument has become less prevalent. Politicians today rarely invoke freedom as a core principle, instead emphasizing outcomes. This utilitarian approach seems more dominant now. Would you agree with this assessment?
William Easterly: I concur, although I would argue that this shift has been gradual and can be traced back to the late 19th century. Economists like Alfred Marshall and the founders of the American Economic Association began prioritizing empirical analysis over moral considerations in economic discourse.
As modern economists, we are indeed heirs to that legacy, and while empirical analysis holds significant value, the consequences of neglecting moral arguments have been profound. This shift has allowed for the justification of harmful ideologies, such as eugenics, as highlighted by Thomas Leonard.
Despite the efforts of successive generations of liberal thinkers to emphasize the importance of freedom as an end in itself—beginning with Adam Smith and extending through figures like P.T. Bauer, Milton Friedman, and Amartya Sen—these messages have often been overlooked or dismissed in the intellectual marketplace. Critics rarely acknowledge the significance of these arguments, focusing instead on whether freedom contributes to GDP.
In the process, modern classical liberals risk downplaying the intrinsic value of freedom, framing it primarily as a means to achieve material prosperity and neglecting its inherent worth as a fundamental human need.
