Europe’s Military Quandary: A Path Forward or a Step Back?
In the aftermath of President Trump’s successful advocacy for NATO allies to allocate 5% of their GDP toward defense by 2035, Europe now faces the Herculean task of overcoming decades of military underinvestment. The ambition to establish a robust defense force capable of countering threats from Russia or China is daunting, compounded by dwindling birth rates, a shrinking labor pool, and the political costs associated with sustaining generous welfare states and pacifist traditions.
During a summit on June 25, 2025, NATO allies agreed to dramatically increase their defense spending target from 2% to 5% of GDP by 2035. This commitment is segmented into 3.5% for “core defense” and 1.5% for wider security measures, including infrastructure and cyber defenses. The announcement was met with accolades; NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte remarked, “Could anyone have imagined this outcome if he hadn’t been re-elected? He deserves all the credit.” However, the enormity of this pledge becomes clear when juxtaposed with current spending levels and existing capability gaps.
In 2024, European NATO members collectively spent $454 billion on defense, representing a mere 30% of total NATO expenditures, while the United States accounted for $997 billion, or 66%. Although reports indicate that European military spending surged by 17% to $693 billion in 2024, this figure is misleading as it includes Russia’s estimated $149 billion defense budget—a rather peculiar choice, given NATO’s primary mission is to deter Russian aggression.
When considering GDP percentages, Europe still lags behind Russia in defense spending. The EU’s total defense expenditure is projected to reach around 2.04% of GDP by 2025, while Russia is expected to allocate a hefty 7.5% of its GDP to military endeavors. However, the spending gap is merely a fragment of Europe’s larger capabilities deficit.
Unlike Russia or the United States, Europe’s defense budget is dispersed across more than 30 nations, each maintaining its own command structure, procurement process, and military bureaucracy. In contrast, the U.S. achieves remarkable efficiency and combat effectiveness through its unified defense budget, which supports a single military framework with global outreach.
Having consistently invested in defense since World War II, American military spending builds on a robust foundation of infrastructure, technology, and institutional knowledge. Conversely, many European militaries are relatively young, particularly those that emerged from Soviet dominance, and decades of underfunding have left them scrambling to catch up.
Moreover, Europe remains heavily reliant on the United States for crucial military functions such as satellite intelligence, threat assessments, air-to-air refueling, ballistic missile defense, airborne electronic warfare, and advanced surveillance capabilities. The sophistication of these systems cannot be rapidly replicated, as they are the result of decades of technological evolution and operational expertise.
Some estimates suggest that Europe would need to boost its annual defense spending by an additional $270 billion merely to approach parity with Russia. More critically, Russia benefits from a wealth of military resources accumulated from Soviet-era assets, which took generations to develop and cannot be quickly replicated. Its defense sector employs 4.5 million people and produces weaponry at almost three times the rate of the combined output of the U.S. and Europe, while many European nations still operate largely peacetime defense industries.
Attempting to match Russia’s military budget, which constitutes 32% of its government expenditure, would inflict severe damage on Europe’s social welfare systems. Currently, European countries allocate an average of 19.5% of GDP to social benefits, encompassing healthcare, pensions, unemployment, and education, with France reaching as high as 31.3%. Elevating defense budgets to Russian levels would necessitate drastic cuts to the very programs that characterize European society: universal healthcare, generous unemployment support, extensive parental leave, free higher education, and comprehensive pensions.
Beyond fiscal challenges, Europe must contend with significant manpower shortages in expanding its military forces. All European nations have fallen below the population replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman. Countries like Malta (1.06), Spain (1.12), Lithuania (1.18), and Italy (1.21) reflect some of the lowest fertility rates. Since World War II, many countries have either diminished or entirely eliminated conscription, with France ending it in 1996, Spain in 2001, Germany in 2011, Belgium in 1994, and the UK as early as 1963.
Only a handful of nations, including Finland, Norway, Cyprus, Austria, Lithuania, Estonia, and Switzerland, still maintain some form of conscription, typically characterized by short terms and limited enforcement. In stark contrast, Russia continues to enforce mandatory conscription for men up to the age of 30.
With declining birth rates and an aging demographic, Europe is left grappling with a shrinking workforce, escalating pension expenses, and limited fiscal capacity for defense or modernization. The challenge of sustaining expansive welfare systems while concurrently establishing credible military power is likely a mathematical impossibility. Faced with constrained tax capabilities, demographic decline, and rising threats from Russia and China, Europe finds itself with an ever-narrowing set of options.
Relying solely on conscription will not remedy the manpower deficit. A significant rise in defense spending is essential, necessitating considerable restructuring and politically contentious cuts to entrenched social programs. Europe stands at a crossroads: it can either uphold its generous welfare model while remaining militarily tethered to the U.S. or pivot towards serious defense investment at the expense of its social framework.
