By Vance Ginn, The Daily Economy, May 23, 2025.
Excerpt:
As outlined by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), gasoline prices are influenced by five main factors: crude oil costs, refining expenses, distribution and marketing, taxes, and regulations. In the Golden State, taxes and regulatory burdens alone contribute over $1.30 per gallon—nearly twice the national average.
California prides itself on having the nation’s highest gas tax, currently set at $0.678 per gallon, not counting various additional fees and environmental surcharges. When you factor in the Cap-and-Trade program, the Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), and unique fuel blends mandated solely in California, the rationale for the state’s inflated prices becomes painfully clear.
The situation is poised to worsen. A study by Mische warns that refinery closures, spurred by stringent permitting processes and meager expected returns under California’s climate regulations, could lead to a 20 percent drop in fuel supply by 2026, even as demand remains relatively constant. Fewer refineries coupled with rigid fuel standards will inevitably translate to tighter supply and soaring prices.
by Jeremy Horpedahl, Cato at Liberty, May 23, 2025.
Excerpts:
In a recent turn of events, President Trump has expressed a rather casual attitude towards consumer choice, suggesting in two separate interviews that it’s perfectly acceptable for little girls to have just three dolls instead of thirty. While this sentiment may resonate with parents overwhelmed by a sea of toys, it conveys a troubling message of economic regressive thinking. One of the chief advantages of economic growth is the increasing diversity and affordability of goods and services.
Sure, kids may tire of their 300th doll, but it’s not the government’s place to dictate such whims. Consumers are naturally inclined to purchase 30 dolls—or whatever else brings them joy. They can certainly choose to buy less, but they are in the best position to decide how many toys their children should have (though parents know this is a never-ending battle!).
And:
When the Barbie movie debuted in 2023, I penned a light-hearted yet earnest post about the positive impact of economic growth on women and young girls. In comparison to the era of Barbie’s original launch in 1959, a woman in 2023 can afford 3–4 times as many dolls for the same amount of work. To quote Chelsea Follett, the number of hours needed to earn enough for a Barbie has plummeted from over an hour to just about 12 minutes. One can only hope that such progress extends across a broader spectrum of goods and services—and in many cases, it indeed does.
by David Hebert and Marcus Witcher, Civitas Institute, May 26, 2025.
Excerpts:
Ronald Reagan’s dedication to free trade remains a pivotal aspect of his legacy. However, grasping the context of his decisions is essential. When Reagan assumed office in 1981, the U.S. economy—especially the auto industry—was in dire straits. Following decades of low gas prices, which made large, fuel-inefficient vehicles from Detroit affordable, an oil crisis ignited in 1973 and intensified in late 1978, hitting American drivers particularly hard. This crisis triggered a series of mini-recessions in both 1980 and 1981.
Concurrently, Japanese automakers began exporting to the U.S. By 1980, Japanese cars held over 20% of the U.S. market, boasting advantages such as superior fuel efficiency due to their smaller size, lower operational costs, and a significantly lower frequency of repairs compared to their American counterparts. They were, in many respects, simply better cars. This surge in quality led to a decline in sales for Detroit’s Big Three automakers—Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler (now Stellantis)—resulting in mass layoffs.
And:
The domestic auto industry during the 1980s and 1990s illustrates a lesson in complacency. Shielded from foreign competition, American automakers became entrenched in their strategies, convinced that the market would always favor mid-size and larger models. Even as Japanese cars remained on the scene, they were becoming increasingly scarce. Meanwhile, Japanese manufacturers continued to enhance their product quality. By 1990, the gap in quality between domestic and Japanese vehicles had widened, with U.S. cars needing repairs more frequently.
During the 1990s, the Big Three were forced to shutter 42 of their 63 assembly plants, resulting in tens of thousands of job losses in an industry that the Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) were supposed to protect. The crux of the matter is clear: Japanese cars were already superior and more affordable than their American counterparts in 1981. The failure of the domestic car industry to adapt led to a shift in consumer preference towards imports. Instead of short-term challenges paving the way for long-term solutions, the initial pain of higher car prices resulted in enduring hardships of reduced employment.
by Benjamin Zycher, The National Interest, May 29, 2025.
Excerpts:
The climate litigation strategy is straightforward: link any conceivable damage to “climate change” and sue fossil fuel producers for supposedly causing that harm while misguiding the public about the impacts they have known for decades. The claims appear simple, and the potential for extracting billions of dollars seems limitless. However, this strategy is unraveling, as evidenced by the recent dismissal of a climate lawsuit by Judge Stephen Corr in the Bucks County, Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas. The judge stated that “Bucks County fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Pennsylvania cannot apply its own laws to claims dealing with air in its ambient or interstate aspects,” leading to a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He further noted, “We join many other state and federal courts in finding that claims raised by Bucks County are solely within the province of federal law.”
And the two “money” paragraphs:
The reaction from many climate litigators is that fossil fuel producers have always been aware of their role in creating a climate crisis but concealed that knowledge from the public. Really? To summarize the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 1990 First Assessment Report (page 202): it could not explain why temperatures were higher 5,000 to 6,000 years ago, despite no evidence of increased greenhouse gas concentrations.
Fast forward to the latest Sixth Assessment Report (2021-2022). The IPCC still struggles to precisely define the “likely” range (p. 46) of climate effects from increased GHG concentrations and can only predict (Table 12.12) various adverse effects with low confidence, and only under extreme emissions scenarios. Did fossil energy producers “know” things decades ago that remain unknown today? The answer is a resounding no.
Note: I just noticed the misspelling on my pic. I’m still learning ChatGPT.
