Despite their shared intellectual heritage, Scruton diverged from Smith’s views on critical issues. Where Smith viewed free markets as a mechanism compatible with a morally robust society, Scruton warned of their potential to erode cultural heritage. His Dictionary of Political Thought suggests that defending limited government and private property doesn’t equate to an endorsement of capitalism (131-132). Moreover, he contended that “free trade is neither possible nor desirable,” advocating instead for regulatory regimes that protect local customs and identities (A Political Philosophy, 32-33). Notably, Scruton criticized liberalism for its individualistic tendencies, emphasizing the necessity of state oversight to prevent destitution and unemployment (112, 62, 150).
These distinctions complicate Scruton’s characterization of Smith as the “philosophical insight” behind modern conservatism (Conservatism: An Invitation to the Great Tradition, 2018, 27). His evolving appreciation for Smith’s ideas, which he previously neglected, highlights a significant philosophical journey. This article will provide a thematic and chronological analysis of Scruton’s interpretation of Smith, examining the human condition and economy, the concept of the invisible hand, and the intersection of morality and markets.
Ultimately, while Scruton gradually acknowledged Smith’s insights, he often misinterpreted or underappreciated the depth of his fundamental concepts.
The Human Condition and the Economy
In A Short History of Modern Philosophy [1981], Scruton briefly engages with the concept of moral sentiments within British philosophy but overlooks an in-depth analysis of Smith, perceiving him as merely reiterating previous insights. He concludes that Smith “produced no new system” (222-223). His substantial comments on Smith are relegated to a chapter on Marx, where he notes:
- “The Wealth of Nations encapsulated a century of liberal and empiricist thought, demonstrating that the free exchange of private property under self-interest preserves justice and promotes societal well-being…”
- “Smith considers human nature as fixed, with the homo economicus of liberal theory portrayed not as a historical figure but as driven by desires that may be peculiar to the eighteenth-century market economy” (212-213).
Two key points merit discussion. First, by downplaying Smith’s originality, Scruton contradicts a growing scholarly trend, especially as Oxford University Press published Smith’s complete works, influencing renewed interest in his ideas. Second, while Scruton accurately captures Smith’s view that free markets can fulfill individual needs and enhance social welfare, he mistakenly confines Smith’s insights to the eighteenth-century context, neglecting their broader applicability and relevance today. The burden of proof lies with those asserting that homo economicus is a mere artifact of the past.
Nevertheless, Scruton’s historical perspective is partially valid; Smith acknowledged that economic institutions are shaped by historical and geographical contexts. Still, he maintained that the “liberty, reason, and happiness of mankind (…) can flourish only where civil government is able to protect them” (WN 803).
“I believe that Scruton’s reading would have been enriched by recognizing that Smith’s account of the economic agent contains valid claims of universality while also acknowledging the historical and cultural variability of economic institutions.”
Thus, Scruton’s interpretation could have been enhanced by acknowledging Smith’s universal claims about the economic agent while also recognizing the historical and cultural variability of economic institutions. From a Smithian viewpoint, economic behaviors and dynamics can transcend specific contexts, yet the development of economic systems remains contingent on their unique political and cultural environments.
The Invisible Hand
In his Dictionary of Political Thought [1982], Scruton discusses both “Adam Smith” and the “Invisible Hand.” He claims, “Smith’s long-term influence on political thought lies in his subtle development of the invisible hand conception of human society” (638-639). However, this requires further clarification; Smith’s invisible hand pertains specifically to the unintended benefits arising from self-interested economic behavior. For instance, affluent consumers may inadvertently contribute to the “distribution of the necessaries of life” (TMS 184). Similarly, when entrepreneurs pursue profits, they often enhance societal revenue (WN 456). Thus, the metaphor elucidates how individual motivations can yield positive societal outcomes.
Scruton’s extension of the invisible hand to encompass all aspects of social life overlooks the complexity of Smith’s analysis, which includes morality, science, politics, and more—domains where the invisible hand does not necessarily apply. Smith’s conceptualization of homo economicus is complemented by natural sympathy and benevolence, both crucial for a thriving society.
Furthermore, Scruton’s assessment of beneficiaries in market dynamics requires refinement. He acknowledges that the invisible hand does not always benefit participants, citing scenarios like the “prisoners’ dilemma.” However, employing this example as representative of market interactions is questionable. The crux of Smith’s argument is that “the system of natural liberty” (WN 687) consistently outperforms alternative systems, provided certain conditions—such as government protection of individuals—are in place (TMS 340-341; WN 687, 708).
Scruton himself notes that the invisible hand is “guided by a legal and institutional framework” (18). Still, referring to these frameworks as “secret guides” creates unnecessary confusion, as Smith’s account views them as public, intentional structures ensuring just and orderly interactions. In areas like public works and education, institutions must be consciously developed through political decisions. However, Scruton incorrectly suggests that such frameworks should not include protections for the workforce’s well-being (2018, 30). Although Smith acknowledged workers’ mental conditions, he did not advocate for direct welfare laws.
Ultimately, Scruton rightly identifies the invisible hand process as “a distillation of social knowledge” that allows market participants to respond to one another’s needs (2018, 28-30). This epistemic function of free markets stands out as one of Smith’s most significant contributions.
Morality and Markets
In How to Be a Conservative [2014], Scruton states that for Smith, markets thrive “only where there is trust among participants… it is where sympathy, duty, and virtue find their rightful place that self-interest leads, by an invisible hand, to a beneficial outcome for all” (28). This prompts a critical inquiry into how markets correlate with trust, sympathy, duty, and virtue.
For Smith, markets fundamentally operate on individual material self-interest: we persuade others “that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them…” (WN 26-27). The moral attributes necessary for successful market exchanges driven by self-interest include “industry, discretion, attention, and application of thought” (WN 304-305). Thus, Scruton misinterprets Smith when he suggests that market exchanges occur “under the eye of conscience – Smith’s impartial spectator” (74). Rather, economic transactions hinge on an unwavering respect for the “rules of a fair game” (TMS 83; WN 687), independent of moral considerations. Trust in the justice system fosters trust among individuals in stable frameworks, reinforcing that justice, rather than conscience, cultivates trust. Consequently, merchants pursue reliable exchanges and laws that protect their interests (WN 454). Scruton aptly recognizes that for Smith, justice as a negative virtue forms “the essential foundation of a well-ordered society” (2018, 27).
In conclusion, the impartial spectator, contrary to John Rawls’s interpretation, does not evaluate social systems or dictate economic actions, as Scruton suggests. Its purpose is to assess individual moral actions. This does not negate the moral dimensions of economic behavior, but these actions are motivated by individuals’ capacity to fulfill mutual interests rather than direct moral imperatives.
By asserting that moral considerations should shape market outcomes, Scruton seems to echo the moralist’s complaint that “wealth and greatness are often accorded the respect due only to wisdom and virtue” (TMS 61-62). While wisdom and virtue hold intrinsic value, they do not govern the market. Smith critiques the “luxury and caprice” stemming from unbridled wealth pursuit; nevertheless, he argues for individual freedom to chase such excesses, positing that in doing so, they inadvertently benefit others through self-interest satisfaction.
Conclusion
Over time, Roger Scruton’s perspective on Smith evolved from skepticism to an appreciation of Smith as a seminal conservative thinker. Initially dismissing Smith’s originality in 1981, by 2018, he recognized Smith’s vital role in the conservative intellectual tradition, integrating his ideas into a broader defense of local cultures and traditions.
However, conservatism may advocate for state intervention to curtail social change, harbor a distrust of abstract theories, and prioritize economic protectionism, as Friedrich Hayek noted in The Constitution of Liberty (519-527). In contrast, classical liberalism embraces change that promotes individual freedom and advocates for a limited governmental role in economic matters. Viewed through this lens, Smith aligns more closely with classical liberalism than with a robust conservative framework.
For more on these topics, see
Although Scruton acknowledged some classical liberal principles from Smith, he remained rooted in conservatism, critiquing liberal individualism and emphasizing national identity over global economic frameworks. His conservative stance shaped his interpretation of Smith’s concepts, leading him to misinterpret the invisible hand as a broad societal principle and reject the feasibility of global free trade. In contrast, Smith utilized the invisible hand primarily as an economic metaphor, advocated for the desirability of free trade, and contended that market limitations should primarily stem from principles of negative justice.
References
F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty. University of Chicago Press, 2011.
Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought. Harper and Row, 1983.
Roger Scruton, A Political Philosophy: Arguments for Conservatism. Bloomsbury, 2019.
Roger Scruton, Conservatism: An Invitation to the Great Tradition. All Points Books, 2018.
Roger Scruton, How to be a Conservative. Bloomsbury, 2015.
Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism. St. Augustine’s Press, 1980.
Roger Scruton, Modern Philosophy: An Introduction and Survey. Bloomsbury, 2012.
*Alejandra M. Salinas is a Professor at UNTREF and UCA in Buenos Aires, focusing on contemporary political philosophy, comparative political theory, social theory, democratic institutions, and the intersection of literature and politics.
For more articles by Alejandra Salinas, see the Archive.
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