The Cost of Building Progress

• Book Review of: Why Nothing Works: Who Killed Progress—and How to Bring It Back by Marc J. Dunkelman,; and

• Abundance by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson.

Vera Coking and the Price of Progress

In 1961, Vera Coking and her spouse acquired a quaint three-story residence in Atlantic City, New Jersey, for the princely sum of $20,000—equivalent to approximately $215,000 today. Initially seeking a summer retreat rather than a financial investment, Coking found herself in the unexpected position of being a reluctant landowner in a casino-driven real estate frenzy. Two decades later, she faced a million-dollar offer from Bob Guccione, the Penthouse mogul, eager to claim her land for his casino venture. She declined. A second attempt came in 1993 from another developer wishing to transform her property into a limousine parking lot, which also met with her resolute refusal.

This time, however, the developer turned to a more aggressive strategy. Unable to secure the land through negotiation, he enlisted the help of the state, specifically the Casino Redevelopment Agency, to exercise eminent domain and evict Coking. The developer argued that a parking lot was a superior public interest compared to a humble single-family home. The implication that his financial motivations were secondary to the public good was just another twist in the tale of progress.

Fortunately for Coking, her plight garnered the attention of The Institute for Justice, a public interest law firm. With their assistance, she achieved a modest victory in court—not because the principle of eminent domain was rejected, but because the state’s plan imposed “no limits” on the developer’s use of the land, as articulated by Superior Court Judge Richard Williams. Consequently, the would-be casino magnate, Donald J. Trump, would have to find alternative parking for his clientele.

Markets, Government, and Obstacles to Abundance

The Coking case serves as a poignant reminder while delving into two recent books that compellingly argue that America has erected significant barriers to new construction, with the potential to unleash a fresh wave of prosperity if only we could simplify the building process. Marc Dunkelman’s Why Nothing Works and Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson’s Abundance stand out for their surprising political angle. All three authors identify as progressive liberals, seeking to persuade the center-left to adopt a pro-growth stance typically associated with conservative ideologies. Instead of merely focusing on equitable distribution of the economic pie, they advocate for strategies to enlarge that pie for all.

This implicit suggestion resonates with long-standing arguments from conservatives and libertarians, emphasizing that a substantial part of the reason for stagnation in American construction lies in governmental interference. Free markets, when unencumbered, have a remarkable ability to innovate and efficiently produce goods and services that people desire. However, when government regulations hinder the development of new housing, we witness a crisis of affordability and homelessness. Similarly, when regulations obstruct the creation of new pharmaceuticals, we find ourselves waiting decades for cures that could have been available much sooner. In these instances, fostering abundance necessitates reducing bureaucratic barriers and allowing the dynamic forces of the free market to flourish.

Yet, as the authors contend, scaling back government regulation is merely a starting point. The underlying issue extends beyond government hindrance of markets; it encompasses government’s own paralysis. Factors such as the “rights revolution” of the late twentieth century and an increasing emphasis on rigid procedures have left governmental institutions incapable of effective action. Well-intentioned though these developments may have been, they have resulted in a plethora of “veto gates,” each capable of stalling progress. The result is a scenario where extending subway lines in New York City drags on for decades, costing twenty times more than similar projects elsewhere, where a clean energy project in Maine sees its costs nearly double years after approval without any ground being broken, and where California struggles to launch a high-speed rail line first greenlit in 1982.

To resume construction, change is imperative. But what specific changes should we pursue? While economic growth is undeniably beneficial, as illustrated by Vera Coking’s story, we must remember that not all growth is desirable. So, how do these books help us navigate the complex landscape of economic development and discern between beneficial and detrimental growth?

The Jeffersonian Trap and Procedural Gridlock

Dunkelman attributes a significant part of the problem to the emergence of “Jeffersonianism,” a governance philosophy characterized by skepticism towards large centralized institutions, aimed at protecting individuals from overreaching authority by decentralizing state power. This philosophy gave birth to a plethora of rights over the twentieth century, designed to shield individuals, communities, and the environment from the clutches of both government and corporate giants. While some protections are undoubtedly necessary, Dunkelman argues that this Jeffersonian approach has been taken too far, necessitating a corrective shift towards a more centralized, Hamiltonian philosophy that embraces expert authority.

While Dunkelman’s distinction highlights two broad public attitudes towards authority, it lacks the philosophical rigor that could enhance our understanding of political decision-making. For instance, he recounts how, in the 1970s, progressives and police unions collaborated to limit police chief discretion to protect officers from abuses of power. However, this reform inadvertently increased the authority of patrol officers, leaving citizens more exposed to unchecked police power.

A similar pattern emerges in various Jeffersonian reforms aimed at conserving the environment. Laws intended to prevent corporate exploitation necessitate the establishment of large bureaucracies to define, adjudicate, and enforce rights. Each change can be viewed as a decentralization of power, but often, the result is simply a redistribution of power that offers little insight into the net influence wielded over individuals. Moreover, it fails to provide a constructive framework for determining how power should be allocated to promote economic growth or other societal values.

Klein and Thompson, on the other hand, present a less formal theoretical framework but consistently emphasize that abundance has been stifled by an excessive focus on proceduralism. In this context, proceduralism refers to the belief that governmental legitimacy is earned through strict adherence to an “endless catalog of rules and restraints.” Laws and regulations must survive rigorous scrutiny, including notice-and-comment sessions, environmental assessments, and court challenges. While these procedural constraints aim to ensure legitimacy and accountability, they often hinder the very government action progressives advocate for in addressing pressing issues.

Rather than fixating on procedures, Klein and Thompson argue for a shift in focus towards tangible outcomes. Citizens are far less concerned about the number of reports generated in the approval process for a new bridge than they are about whether the bridge is constructed efficiently and safely.

This perspective, while seemingly commonsensical, faces a significant hurdle: governments lack a direct mechanism for selecting outcomes. They can create institutions, laws, taxes, and subsidies, but the actual realization of desired outcomes depends on a multitude of external factors beyond their control.

To illustrate, consider a parent wishing for their child to become a skilled runner. Merely stating the goal (“Become a great runner!”) is insufficient without actionable steps. A competent coach will break down the desired outcome into specific practices: focusing on form, controlling breathing, and logging miles. This process-oriented approach, while not guaranteeing success, increases the likelihood of achieving the goal. Similarly, government procedures serve as guidelines to direct attention towards manageable elements that can influence outcomes that lie outside of direct control.

Procedures are not only beneficial; they are also unavoidable. Achieving outcomes necessitates some form of process. The critical question is whether we will define that process clearly or leave it to chance and the discretion of involved parties. Poorly conceived procedures can not only hinder the desired outcome but also provide opportunities for manipulation by interest groups prioritizing their agendas over the common good.

Capture, Cronyism, and Government Ineffectiveness

This leads us to a notable gap in both books. Despite their emphasis on the shortcomings of government policy—be it in building infrastructure or adequately incentivizing market actors—there is surprisingly little engagement with public choice theory, a field that systematically examines the nature and causes of government failure. Aside from a brief mention of Mancur Olson’s classic The Rise and Decline of Nations, the authors largely overlook discussions of rent-seeking, agency capture, and the structural incentives that yield the pathologies they describe. Without a clear diagnosis of the underlying issues, their proposed solutions lack clarity, persuasiveness, and political feasibility.

Public choice theory highlights critical aspects of information and incentive challenges that hinder government endeavors. Government officials frequently lack the nuanced, context-specific knowledge necessary to implement socially beneficial outcomes and often lack the motivation to pursue such outcomes, even if they possess the requisite knowledge. These issues are not transient; they stem from an “inescapable, structural condition” of limited tools and understanding of the complex social landscape that officials aim to navigate, as articulated by Peter Schuck in his book, Why Government Fails So Often: And How It Can Do Better.

This critique is particularly pertinent to Klein and Thompson’s call for a more substantial governmental role in fostering innovation. They assert that the belief that government is “inept at picking winners” is a myth detached from historical reality, drawing heavily from Mariana Mazzucato’s work. They argue that government has played a pivotal role in the development of numerous technologies that shape our contemporary lives, from the iPhone to shale drilling and federally subsidized mortgages.

However, Mazzucato’s narrative does not come without dissent. A deeper engagement with public choice literature or with critiques from scholars like Alberto Mingardi and Deirdre McCloskey might have prompted Klein and Thompson to confront these objections. Regrettably, they do not address these criticisms, nor do they engage critically with them.

It is astounding to note that terms like “cronyism” or “rent-seeking” do not appear at all in Abundance. Should government assume the role of identifying and supporting potential economic “winners,” there is an inherent risk that decisions will favor the politically connected rather than the most deserving candidates. The larger the incentive, the more intense the competition for political connections, often to the detriment of those outside the established networks.

Innovation is inherently a process of trial and error, and while both markets and governments will encounter failures, they manifest differently. Private enterprises gamble with their own resources, encouraging a careful evaluation of risks and rewards. Conversely, government investments use public funds, often resulting in larger-scale failures. Moreover, private business failures are typically short-lived, as the competitive market weeds out unsuccessful firms. Government failures, however, tend to persist, benefiting narrow interest groups that have a vested interest in maintaining ineffective programs.

Abundance and Comparative Political Economy

The intent behind these criticisms is not to undermine the abundance agenda. On the contrary, Dunkelman, Klein, and Thompson present an ambitious and inspiring vision. This agenda holds potential for unifying the progressive liberal commitment to advancing the poor’s interests with classical liberalism’s focus on the creative drive of competitive markets—a brilliant synthesis often referred to as the “liberaltarian” agenda. Additionally, it channels efforts toward a positive-sum direction, yielding cumulative benefits over time.

The authors deserve commendation for popularizing this agenda. However, they fall short in addressing the crucial question of how—what concrete steps can we take to meaningfully and sustainably promote abundance? Answering this question necessitates a deeper dive into comparative political economy methods, as advanced by scholars like Peter Boettke and Mark Pennington. Numerous challenges lie ahead, but with a bit of luck, the abundance movement is just beginning its journey.

Footnotes

[1] Marc J. Dunkelman. Why Nothing Works: Who Killed Progress—and How to Bring It Back. Feb. 2025.

[2] Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson. Abundance. Mar. 2025.

[3] Nicholas Bagley, “The Procedural Fetish.” Niskanen Center, 7-Dec-21

[4] Peter Schuck, Why Government Fails So Often: And How It Can Do Better (Princeton: 2014).

[5] See Mariana Mazzucato, The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths (Anthem, 2013).

[6] See Alberto Mingardi and Deirdre McCloskey, The Myth of the Entrepreneurial State (AIER, 2020).

[7] See, for discussion, Jonathan Rauch, Demosclerosis (Three Rivers Press, 1994).

[8] See Brink Lindsey, “Liberaltarians”. Cato Institute, 04-Dec-06. In an interview with Lindsey, Steve Teles describes the connections between the abundance movement and liberaltarianism. See “Steve Teles on Abundance: Prehistory, Present, and Future,” 11-Jun-25.

[9] As such, the abundance movement has natural affinities with the “longtermist” branch of effective altruism. On longtermism, see William McAskill, What We Owe the Future (Basic Books, 2022). On the overriding long-term significance of economic growth, see Tyler Cowen, Stubborn Attachments: A Vision for a Society of Free, Prosperous, and Responsible Individuals (Stripe, 2018).

[10] The sympathetic critic Noah Smith makes a similar point. See his “Progressives Take their Best Shot at Abundance (But It Falls Short),” 17-Jun-25.

[11] See Peter Boettke, “The New Comparative Political Economy,” 12-Dec-05; and Mark Pennington, Robust Political Economy: Classical Liberalism and the Future of Public Policy (Edward Elgar, 2011).