Let’s revisit an intriguing debate from early 2024, when Trump proclaimed that he wouldn’t guarantee defense for NATO members who failed to allocate at least 2% of their GDP to military spending. At the time, Tyler Cowen offered his insights:
As many are aware, Trump made the controversial statement that NATO countries not meeting the 2% GDP defense spending requirement would be left to fend for themselves against Russian aggression (you can watch the relevant video here, with Canadian commentary). In a rather provocative manner, he even suggested he would encourage such an aggressor.
Long-time readers of MR know well my disdain for Trump—not just as president, but in general. (And I hold NATO in high regard.) However, on this particular issue, I find Trump’s stance somewhat defensible. Yes, I’m aware of the potential backlash effects, but many NATO members consistently fail to maintain robust defense capabilities. Our collective exhortations over the years have not produced the desired results.
While I personally wouldn’t adopt Trump’s approach, nor would I employ such extreme rhetoric in my own professional dealings—“if you don’t publish enough for tenure, we’ll let Bukele take you!” or “Spinoza, if you keep scratching the couch, I won’t protect you against the coyotes!”), I can’t help but think that an “unreasonable” approach might be warranted in this context, regardless of whether I’m the right person to advocate it.
While this argument holds some water, I maintain a different perspective:
I contend that both Trump and Tyler misinterpret NATO’s primary role. It’s not merely about military expenditure; instead, NATO serves as a formidable mutual defense pact that dissuades any nation from attacking even its smallest members. Viewed through this lens, NATO has been extraordinarily successful.
Take the ongoing war in Ukraine, for instance, where Russia has found itself stalled for two years. To suggest that Ukraine is weaker than NATO is a gross understatement. NATO comprises 31 members, many of which are wealthier and more powerful than Ukraine. As long as NATO remains united, Russia would be unlikely to launch an attack on even a diminutive member like Estonia. The difference between Germany spending 1.4% versus 2.0% of GDP on defense is negligible; NATO’s strength is immense—if it remains united.
But will NATO hold together? During his first term, Trump expressed to aides his desire to withdraw the U.S. from NATO in a potential second term. This desire is precisely why Putin is keen on Trump’s electoral success.
Recent events have tended to support my concerns:
1. The nascent Trump administration has exhibited overt hostility toward NATO, with key figures advocating for a U.S. exit from the alliance—despite many vital NATO members recently increasing their defense spending beyond the 2% threshold that critics had previously demanded.
2. While even 2% of GDP could be viewed as inadequate—given that the U.S. allocates over 3%—Trump’s new demand of at least 5% seems intentionally unrealistic, especially for nations grappling with the financial burden of extensive welfare systems. This is an obvious pretext for the U.S. to withdraw from the alliance. Such demands suggest a desire for the alliance to collapse. While Trump lacks the legal authority to formally exit NATO, his actions seem aimed at creating a perception of a de facto withdrawal.
3. In the context of the Ukraine War, Trump has shifted U.S. support from Ukraine and NATO to a pro-Russian stance. Critics had previously pointed to Trump’s tough approach toward Russia during his first term, failing to recognize that he had largely deferred foreign policy to mainstream Republicans. However, his campaign promises for a radically different approach in his second term have materialized. The U.S. now aligns with Russia rather than Europe regarding accountability for the war, even as China abstains from taking a side. The current U.S. administration labels Zelensky as a “dictator” while refraining from applying the same label to Putin. Far from being delusional, I’ve actually underestimated Trump’s affinity for Russia. I anticipated he would cut off financial aid to Ukraine but did not foresee him undermining Ukraine in ways that didn’t even benefit U.S. interests, such as halting intelligence sharing and opposing resolutions condemning Russia.
Like Tyler, I hold NATO in high esteem; I consider it one of the most significant advancements of the post-WWII era, helping Europe transcend the destructive nationalism that plagued the early 20th century. It’s conceivable that a supporter of such a multinational organization might advocate for pressuring its members to strengthen the alliance—an approach Tyler endorses. Yet, Trump is not a proponent of multilateral organizations; he is a self-identified nationalist who opposes NATO, the EU, NAFTA, and even his renegotiated version of NAFTA (USMCA).
When discussing a contentious figure who may have a valid point in a specific area, it’s crucial to ensure that the point of contention aligns with the perspectives being considered. In the case of Tyler Cowen, Donald Trump, and NATO, I doubt there’s a shared understanding.
Some readers align with my economic views while dissenting on foreign policy. To engage that audience, consider this analogy: imagine you advocate for free markets but are less than fond of the Trudeau government, and you acknowledge valid grievances regarding Canadian trade policy. What might be the optimal U.S. strategy?
Perhaps the U.S. government could discreetly approach Canada to renegotiate specific issues, trading concessions. While I’m not convinced this is necessary, it’s a perspective some might hold. They could also wait for the Canadian election, given that the Conservative Party enjoyed a 25% lead in the polls, which seemed to be growing.
Now, let’s examine the repercussions of the recent U.S.-Canada trade conflict:
1. The Canadian election is now a tight race, primarily due to widespread public outrage over perceived U.S. bullying. The party you support might lose an election that was previously considered secure.
2. An anti-American sentiment in Canada complicates any Canadian government’s ability to make trade concessions, far more than it would have if the U.S. administration had genuinely sought a collaborative, win-win solution.
So, what’s my point? Simply expressing dissatisfaction with NATO or the global trade framework isn’t enough. Not every critic of these structures offers constructive solutions; some are nihilists desiring to dismantle rather than improve.
Many may harbor reservations about international organizations, but I suspect their absence will be felt once they’re gone. If smaller nations can’t depend on military alliances, they may feel compelled to establish their own nuclear deterrents. Do we really want a world filled with numerous nuclear powers?
What could possibly go wrong?
Here’s the BBC’s estimate of NATO military spending:
