The US nuclear weapons community, in its analysis of the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, often emphasizes either nuclear proliferation as justification for military actions or the associated risks of such proliferation. However, discussions on nuclear security in the Middle East need to be contextualized within the long history of US and Israeli strategies to further their interests in the region. Three significant themes arise from this context.
1. The US has Long Influenced Iranian Affairs, Including Nuclear Power
In 1953, the United States and the United Kingdom orchestrated a coup to remove Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, who had nationalized Iran’s extensive British oil assets, and installed the pro-Western Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as Iran’s autocratic leader.
Under the Eisenhower administration’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative, the US transferred nuclear technology to several countries, including Iran, as part of strengthening the Cold War pro-Western alliance while expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal. Beneficiaries, including Israel and Pakistan, received nuclear technology for scientific, medical, and energy applications. In 1967, the US gifted Iran a nuclear research reactor, and Iranian scientists trained in the US subsequently helped expand Iran’s nuclear program in the 1970s.
During this period, actions by the Shah raised US concerns about nuclear proliferation. Despite Iran signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, the Shah hinted at pursuing nuclear weapons, especially after India’s 1974 “peaceful nuclear explosion.” He also negotiated major nuclear reactor purchase deals with France, the US, and West Germany.
This was particularly troubling as the Shah expressed interest in spent-fuel reprocessing, denounced restrictions on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and asserted a national right under the NPT to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle. This right was justified by both the Shah’s regime and the current theocracy on the need to diversify energy sources due to potential oil reserve declines. Spent-fuel reprocessing can produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, and the Shah’s deals could have enabled Iran to produce hundreds of such weapons.
Despite fears of nuclear proliferation by the Shah or his successors, US administrations prioritized deals and regional alliances. The Shah agreed to US reprocessing restrictions by 1978, but the Islamic Revolution halted nuclear cooperation progress.
The revolution stemmed from frustrations over economic issues from the Shah’s modernization projects, wealth disparity, corruption, political repression, and forced Westernization. After the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988), where the US supported Iraq, Iranian leaders sought to revive their nuclear program using centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment acquired from Pakistan through the black market.
This history illustrates the US’s enduring foreign interventionism, from the 1953 government overthrow to President Trump’s stated goal for a second US-backed regime change. It highlights the US’s inconsistent handling of nuclear proliferation issues, depending on a country’s alignment with US interests, with neither approach conducive to Iran’s or the region’s stability.
2. The US and Israel Have Violated International Law to Prevent Nuclear Weapon Acquisition by Others
The historical record reveals a pattern of US-Israeli collusion in preemptive attacks in the region and a pattern of impunity. On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel attacked Iran less than two days after US and Iranian negotiators held indirect talks in Geneva through Omani mediation to negotiate a deal over Iran’s uranium enrichment activities. The first Trump administration had withdrawn in 2018 from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed to in 2015 by Iran, the US under the Obama administration, other UN Security Council permanent members, and Germany. This deal limited uranium enrichment levels and included intrusive IAEA inspections in exchange for economic sanctions relief. Since the US withdrawal and the re-imposition of severe sanctions, Iran restricted IAEA monitoring and increased uranium enrichment levels to 60%, close to weapons-grade enrichment at 90%.
Despite the alarming increase in enrichment, President Trump’s Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard testified in March 2025 that the US intelligence community assessed Iran was not building a nuclear weapon and that Supreme Leader Khamenei had not authorized a nuclear weapons program since he suspended it in 2003.
In June 2025, during the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza, Israel attacked Iranian military and nuclear sites and assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists with Trump’s knowledge. The US had been negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program, and Trump had given Iran an ultimatum if a deal was not reached. US forces joined Israel in attacking Iran 12 days after the first Israeli strikes, with Trump declaring Iran’s nuclear program “obliterated.”
Attacking nuclear facilities is against international law, but it wasn’t Israel’s first such action, having attacked nuclear sites in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. In Iraq’s case, the US blocked punitive action at the UN and the IAEA General Conference, and in Syria’s case, the attacks occurred with US tacit approval. Israel also assassinated scientists involved in Egypt’s missile program in the 1960s and Iraq’s nuclear program in the 1970s.
Reports suggest Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu had been planning the war on Iran for months, even as negotiations were ongoing, with Arab states appealing to Trump to avoid war through backchannels. One of Trump’s justifications for the war was a pretext for gaining domestic and international consent. Without a credible threat from Iran, as US intelligence assessments contradicted claims of a nuclear bomb or missiles capable of reaching the US, the attacks were illegal under international law.
This nuclear bomb pretext mirrors President George W. Bush’s rationale for the 2003 Iraq invasion—allegations of weapons of mass destruction refuted by the IAEA and ultimately proven false. That invasion has had enduring regional and global consequences.
3. Transparency in Regional Nuclear Activities, Including Israel’s Weapons Program, is Crucial
Israel’s nuclear weapons program, the only one in the Middle East, began in the 1960s with French assistance. Israel maintains deliberate ambiguity about its nuclear arsenal, neither confirming nor denying its existence. The program remains unacknowledged by the United States. Former Israeli nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu revealed program details to the press in 1986, opposing nuclear weapons, and faced severe punishment. During the Hamas-Israeli war, an Israeli minister and a parliament member referenced Israel’s nuclear weapons, suggesting their use in Gaza.
Contrasting Israel’s nuclear monopoly with the US’s role as a leader in nuclear nonproliferation exposes US hypocrisy. The perception of a double standard is reinforced by US-Israeli preemptive strikes against regional nuclear facilities. It’s unsurprising if other regional states engage in activities the US finds unacceptable to ensure their security. Iran threatened to target Israel’s Dimona nuclear facility if the US and Israel continued seeking regime change.
A proposal that could enhance nuclear security in the region is the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (MEWMDFZ), initially proposed by Egypt and Iran at the UN in 1974. The MEWMDFZ covers nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems, adopted in a 1995 resolution to help extend the NPT indefinitely.
This zone would promote disarmament for peace among Arab states, Iran, and Israel. Progress depends on Israeli and US cooperation with Arab states and Iran in the UN framework. Until the zone is realized, the region and world might face the prospect of an Iranian bomb and possibly a Saudi Arabian bomb if these nations increasingly see nuclear deterrence as legitimate. For more on MEWMDFZ, see here, here, and here.
Long-term Regional Stability is at Risk
If US policies in the Middle East continue on a path of narrow self-interest, akin to those during the Cold War, the risks—nuclear and beyond—facing the various actors in regional geopolitics could be immense. It is questionable whether the US’s Gulf allies will maintain trust in the US, having been drawn into a war of choice without their consent. The future of US defense commitments remains uncertain amid the realities of a destabilized Iran and an expansionist Israel. For lasting peace, the US and Israel must eventually pursue diplomacy and multilateral initiatives like the weapons of mass destruction-free zone.
