R. R. Reno’s book The Return of the Strong Gods ambitiously traverses a wide array of topics, dipping into the realm of economics along the way. Yet, when it comes to his economic assertions, readers may find themselves disappointed.
In exploring the roots of economic inequality, Reno states, “This is the sort of assertion I prefer to leave to the economic theorists to debate.” This instinct is commendable, but it’s one he could have applied more consistently throughout his work. Some of his assertions veer into the peculiar; for instance, he claims economists argue that the “‘animal spirits’ of the economy need to be freed from oppressive regulations.” This interpretation is perplexing, as “animal spirits,” a concept popularized by John Maynard Keynes, actually supports the case for regulation. In The General Theory, Keynes articulates:
Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability due to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits – of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.
Economists reading Reno’s assertions may find themselves cringing, especially when he suggests that Apple should manufacture its products domestically. He boldly claims, “The problem is not the ‘vast scale’ [of international supply chains]. Apple and other large companies could easily afford capital investments in large plants in the United States.” This statement caused me to wince with secondhand embarrassment—my spouse even noticed my dismay.
Reno critiques the philosophy of open societies, arguing that it should favor “advantageous trade, not open trade.” However, proponents of open trade assert precisely the opposite: that open trade is inherently advantageous. Reno fails to engage with or counter the economic arguments supporting open trade, instead declaring them mutually exclusive without justification. This is a classic case of begging the question, assuming the very point under debate.
One of Reno’s most glaring oversights is his interpretation of F. A. Hayek. He posits that the postwar paradigm (perhaps what today’s youth might refer to as a “vibe shift”) views strong social norms as unjust constraints that ought to be weakened. Astonishingly, he attributes this perspective to Hayek, a staunch defender of the necessity of maintaining robust social norms. For example, Reno claims that for Hayek, “there is always greater freedom for the individual when the social consensus about right and wrong is weakened.” This characterization is as accurate as claiming that FDR spent his leisure time perfecting his marathon technique.
A more precise summary of Hayek’s philosophy is provided in Erwin Dekker’s The Viennese Students of Civilization:
If we think back to our first section in which we argued that Menger and Schaffer changed the start and end point of economics, we recognize that in Hayek the individual is not the starting point anymore. What is perhaps even more surprising, he or she is also not the end point. Hayek argues that the submission to constraints is the only way that the individual can contribute to something that is ‘greater than himself’ (Hayek, 1948: 8); that, which is bigger than himself is the civilization of which he is a part. Hayek argues that civilization makes individual autonomy possible, and that individual actions contribute to civilization. In no straightforward way can this be called methodological individualism anymore…
Freedom for the Viennese students of civilization, and especially for Hayek, is not the absence of constraints. Freedom for them is enabled by traditions, morality, and institutions to which the individual must submit so that he can be free.
Reno appears to project his own interpretation onto Hayek’s work. At times, he seems to acknowledge the incongruence of his descriptions with Hayek’s writings, offering disclaimers such as Hayek “does not say it explicitly” or that Hayek’s explanations “are not as precise as Popper.” In other instances, he speculates on Hayek’s “true” intentions, claiming, “By ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ the economist Hayek undoubtedly means increasing or reducing my utility rather than congruent with morality or not.” This reductionist view overlooks the expansive nature of Hayek’s thought. Hayek famously stated, “Nobody can be a great economist who is only an economist – and I am even tempted to add that the economist who is only an economist is likely to become a nuisance if not a positive danger.”
The crux of Reno’s interpretation seems to hinge on this passage from The Road to Serfdom (emphasis added by me):
What the German and Italian who have learned the lesson wants above all is protection against the monster state – not grandiose schemes for organization on a colossal scale, but opportunity peacefully and in freedom to build up once more their own little worlds.
Reno’s frequent and critical references to the phrase “little worlds”—he mentions it at least eighteen times—suggest he is fixated on this concept. He interprets Hayek’s statement to imply that in public affairs, we ought to abandon aspirations for greatness and instead pursue only “little worlds”: decent health, modest wealth, and everyday pleasures. However, Hayek never suggested that individuals should relinquish their pursuit of greatness or transcendence. His assertion regarding the “freedom to build up once more their own little worlds” does not equate to limiting oneself to mere “little worlds,” nor does it imply a renunciation of higher ambitions.
Reno’s criticisms of Milton Friedman exhibit a similar lack of precision, but I shan’t belabor the point. Such fundamental errors in representation trigger my “Gell-Mann Amnesia” alert—a term coined by author Michael Crichton, who remarked:
Briefly stated, the Gell-Mann Amnesia effect is as follows. You open the newspaper to an article on some subject you know well. In Murray’s case, physics. In mine, show business. You read the article and see the journalist has absolutely no understanding of either the facts or the issues. Often, the article is so wrong it actually presents the story backward—reversing cause and effect. I call these the “wet streets cause rain” stories. Paper’s full of them.
In any case, you read with exasperation or amusement the multiple errors in a story, and then turn the page to national or international affairs, and read as if the rest of the newspaper was somehow more accurate about Palestine than the baloney you just read. You turn the page and forget what you know.
In a similar vein, when I observe Reno making such fundamental errors in his representation of Hayek’s thought, it diminishes my confidence in his analysis on other matters. Although I lack expertise in Albert Camus’s philosophy, Reno critiques Camus as well. Should I accept his interpretation without question? Given his missteps regarding Hayek, I remain highly skeptical about the accuracy of his portrayal of Camus.
In The Fellowship of the Ring, Bilbo Baggins, having extended his life through the influence of the One Ring, confides in Gandalf that he feels “thin, sort of stretched, like butter scraped over too much bread.” Like many authors of sweeping societal theories, Reno has overextended himself, attempting to weave together a multitude of disparate ideas and fields into one grand narrative.
Despite these critiques, I found value in Reno’s book. While his arguments may not constitute an airtight case, they provoke thought—a quality I appreciate. I strive to be someone who rules thinkers in, not out. So, while Reno’s arguments leave much to be desired, I’m grateful for the opportunity to engage with them and will continue to reflect on their implications. If a book can inspire such contemplation, then it has indeed justified its place on my reading list.
