In the aftermath of a legal ruling on a particular policy, discussions often ensue that misconstrue the court’s role as one of endorsing or rejecting the policy itself. A prime example surfaced when the US Court of International Trade invalidated Trump’s tariffs, which had been instituted under the International Economic Policy Act (IEEPA) of 1977. Supporters of these tariffs rushed to social media, labeling the decision a “judicial coup” against an essential economic strategy. The Trump Administration responded forcefully, asserting:
It is not for unelected judges to determine the appropriate response to a national emergency. President Trump committed to prioritizing America, and our administration will leverage all available executive powers to tackle this crisis and restore American greatness.
Conversely, after the US Supreme Court’s decision to overturn Roe v. Wade in the case of Dobbs, many on the Left denounced the ruling as a sanctioning of poor policy (specifically, abortion restrictions). Their contention was that the issue with Dobbs lay not in the legality of the law, but in the desirability of legal abortion as a policy.
However, it is essential to recognize that courts are not established to assess policy. Their function is to interpret the law and ensure that actions are in accordance with it. If courts were to uphold or strike down actions based on their desirability, it would represent a judicial coup in itself—essentially the courts engaging in policy-making, which is precisely what dissenters criticize.
Take the case of VOS Selections, for instance. The court was not tasked with determining whether tariffs are an effective tool for managing trade deficits or if they should be utilized in trade negotiations. Instead, the pivotal question revolved around whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (“IEEPA”) grants the President the authority to impose unrestricted tariffs on goods from nearly every country worldwide. The merits of tariffs as a policy are extraneous to whether the President had the legal authority under the statute he invoked.
Courts lack the capacity to discern good from bad policy; that responsibility rests solely with Congress. Congress must articulate its intentions clearly when empowering the executive branch on significant matters. For the courts to endorse or reject policies based solely on their perceived merits would be to overstep their bounds and usurp authority from the legislative branch (refer to Biden v. Nebraska, pages 25–26). It is Congress that determines which policies should be enacted.
In the United States, the foundation of all governmental authority is the Constitution. This authority does not stem from winning elections or any supposed manifestation of the “public will.” The Constitution stands as “the supreme Law of the Land,” and all governmental actions must align with it (see Article VI). The courts’ role is to ensure that all parties adhere to the law, regardless of how commendable their intentions may seem.
I commend the International Trade Court’s ruling in VOS Selections for its adherence to both economic reasoning and legal principle. However, if the circumstances were reversed and Trump were to unilaterally revoke all tariffs—a policy I would support—I would still advocate for the courts to nullify such an action. Tax policy is the sole domain of Congress. Congress is the arbiter of what constitutes good or bad policy, while courts ought to refrain from such determinations. By invalidating the tariffs in VOS Selections (or the student loan forgiveness in Biden v. Nebraska), the courts are not making a statement about the social or political value of those policies, but rather evaluating their legal underpinnings. To argue that tariffs are crucial negotiating tools, for instance, is entirely beside the point. Such discussions belong in Congress, which the courts have reaffirmed (as seen in both VOS Selections and Biden v. Nebraska) as the appropriate venue for these deliberations.
