By the authority granted to me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, I hereby declare:
Section 1. Policy. The United States military stands as the most formidable and effective fighting force globally. It employs the world’s most sophisticated weapons systems and technologies, utilizing state-of-the-art equipment to maintain battlefield supremacy. To sustain this dominance amid renewed great power rivalries, the United States must safeguard its supply chains from physical, cyber, and economic threats. It is the policy of the United States that not just the finished military equipment, but also the essential materials and components required for their production, maintenance, sustainability, and repair, should be sourced domestically or from allied nations.
Despite a longstanding ban on using sensitive materials from geopolitical adversaries, defense contractors have historically neglected domestic production and resilience. My Administration will ensure strict adherence to the statutory requirements of 10 U.S.C. 4872, resulting in robust domestic and allied supply chains.
Sec. 2. Restricting Waivers. (a) On January 1, 2027, the Secretary of War (Secretary) along with the Secretaries of the military departments will halt the issuance of waivers under 10 U.S.C. 4872(c)(1) for acquiring covered materials as outlined in 10 U.S.C. 4872, except as mentioned in subsection (b). Waivers under 10 U.S.C. 4872(e) will only be granted as specified in subsection (b) or following a request made to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
(b) The Secretary can continue to issue waivers under 10 U.S.C. 4872(c)(1) or (e) otherwise restricted by subsection (a) for acquiring covered materials under 10 U.S.C. 4872, provided that the prime contractor or subcontractor submits a formal mitigation plan, approved by the Secretary or his designee, that:
(i) Identifies the source of the covered material which would be non-compliant with 10 U.S.C. 4872 without a waiver;
(ii) Provides evidence of exhaustive efforts to procure compliant covered material or demonstrates its unavailability at the time of acquiring non-compliant material;
(iii) Details the steps the prime contractor or subcontractor will take to eliminate the non-compliant covered material from supply chains; and
(iv) Establishes a precise timeline for the full implementation of the mitigation plan.
(c) A prime contractor’s or subcontractor’s inability to qualify a domestic source of covered material does not constitute non-availability for a waiver under 10 U.S.C. 4872(c)(1), unless the contractor shows active, adequately funded, and ongoing efforts to qualify a domestic source of the material.
(d) Should the Secretary find that a prime contractor or subcontractor has engaged in fraud or intentionally misled the Federal Government in any aspect of its mitigation plan, or failed to implement the plan as approved, the Secretary will take all appropriate actions and exercise all contractual remedies deemed necessary, consistent with applicable law. The Secretary may also refer the matter to the Attorney General for further investigation and potential prosecution as appropriate.
(e) Within 180 days of this order, the Secretary will provide the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs a list of actions and contractual remedies available or exercised to address knowing or willful noncompliance by prime contractors and subcontractors.
(f) The Secretary will review the Department of War’s current exemption application for electronic devices under 10 U.S.C. 4872(c)(3)(B) to ensure it continues to meet national security needs.
Sec. 3. Critical Supply Chain Mapping and Illumination. (a) Within 180 days, the Secretary will develop policies and guidance for mapping and illuminating, as detailed in subsection (b), critical supply chains for all Department of War acquisitions related to national security, from raw materials to end-use products delivered to the Department of War. Within 90 days of completion, the Secretary will issue implementing regulations, ensuring that small businesses, non-traditional defense companies, and new entrant firms can comply without undue burden, aligning with statutory domestic and allied sourcing requirements.
(b) The proposed regulations under subsection (a) will require that:
(i) Contractors submit a complete indentured Bill of Materials to the Department of War that traces all components, parts, equipment, software, and materials back to their raw material origins;
(ii) Contractors establish and implement written procedures, in line with existing Department of War procedures, for conducting supply chain risk assessments. This includes screening subcontractors and suppliers for supply chain risks and challenges in the categories of financial, foreign ownership/control/influence, and manufacturing/supply;
(iii) Subject to section 6(a), contractors are prohibited from using covered materials supplied by an unreliable foreign supplier.
(c) After completing the vetting activities described in subsection (b)(ii), contractors must:
(i) Implement timely mitigation actions, as outlined in the required Supply Chain Risk Management Plan, to reduce identified risks’ likelihood or impact;
(ii) Track active mitigation actions until they are closed;
(iii) Notify the Department of War of any significant supply chain risks identified within 15 days of completing the vetting activities;
(iv) Submit a written, confidential corrective action plan within 45 days of completing the vetting activities, detailing implemented mitigations and a strict timeline for completing the corrective action plan;
(v) Submit a closeout report upon completing the corrective action plan.
(d) In response to vulnerabilities, bottlenecks, and single points of failure identified through contractor acquisition information, the Department of War must map national security vulnerabilities related to sourcing key raw materials or other supply chain links, using tools and technologies, including artificial intelligence. The Secretary must consider identified vulnerabilities before issuing any waivers under 10 U.S.C. 4872(c)(1) or (e), as required by section 2 of this order.
Sec. 4. Qualification of Domestic Sources. (a) Within 180 days, the Secretary will begin regulatory action to:
(i) Identify all existing Department of War acquisitions related to United States national security at his sole discretion;
(ii) Require contractors who rely on supply chains including materials or components from unreliable foreign suppliers to qualify and use alternative sources for such materials or components, unless no alternative source is available.
(b) A contractor’s failure to qualify an alternative source under subsection (a) can lead the Secretary to suspend or terminate task orders, decline to exercise contract options, and terminate existing contracts, consistent with law and contract terms.
(c) Within 90 days, the Secretary will devise a strategy to expedite testing and qualifying new sources and materials by prime contractors and subcontractors. This strategy will include developing new software, technical testing procedures, qualification methodologies, and resources. It will also identify and begin to rescind regulations that hinder rapid testing and qualification necessary for defense production.
Sec. 5. Reporting. (a) Every six months until January 1, 2028, the Secretary will report to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on actions taken under this order. This report will include:
(i) Any ongoing use of waivers by prime contractors or subcontractors under 10 U.S.C. 4872;
(ii) The number of mitigation plans accepted under section 2(b) and the progress made by contractors in fulfilling their commitments;
(iii) Progress on implementing regulations required by sections 3 and 4 and the acquisitions covered by those regulations.
(b) The report may include a classified annex if deemed necessary by the Secretary for national security reasons.
Sec. 6. Project Vault and U.S. Funded Sources. (a) This order does not affect the U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve (Project Vault) for which the Export-Import Bank of the United States is a lender or the acquisition by contractors of critical minerals or components produced by foreign projects financed, guaranteed, or insured by the Export-Import Bank or the United States International Development Finance Corporation.
(b) The sale of critical materials or components by Project Vault to a contractor will not be considered a credit sale of a defense article or service under 12 U.S.C. 635(b)(6)(A).
(c) This order does not impair or affect the acquisition by contractors of critical minerals or components produced by companies or projects receiving support from the Department of State, the Department of War, the Department of Commerce, or the Department of Energy.
Sec. 7. Definitions. For this order:
(a) “Critical supply chain” refers to all tiers of suppliers and subcontractors providing essential goods, materials, systems, software, or services for contract deliverables, mission assurance, security, or resilience, as defined by the Secretary.
(b) “Indentured Bill of Materials” includes all components, parts, equipment, software, and materials traced back to raw materials during the design, development, and initial fielding process. It includes data for maintenance planning, logistics, reliability, system safety, engineering, cost, cataloging, item management, and feedback. This document may be disclosed to contractor personnel under a Department of War contract if necessary for providing independent or impartial advice or technical assistance directly to the Federal Government, within the scope of covered contracts, and with proprietary information protected against unauthorized disclosure or use.
(c) A “financial” supply chain risk or challenge refers to a supplier’s inability to generate revenue or income, resulting in financial distress, inability to meet obligations, hostile takeovers, or bankruptcy.
(d) “Foreign ownership, control, or influence” means a foreign interest has the power to direct or decide matters affecting a company’s management or operations, potentially resulting in unauthorized information access or adversely affecting national security-related contracts or programs.
(e) A “manufacturing and supply” supply chain risk or challenge occurs when a single supplier, sector, or market cannot meet demand due to reduced throughput or delays caused by capacity constraints, obsolescence, industrial limitations, market conditions, and supplier practices, disrupted material delivery, and other conditions. Concerns include supply availability, surge capacity, sole-source reliance, and over-reliance on a single source.
(f) “Unreliable foreign supplier” refers to a person subject to foreign ownership, control, or influence by a covered nation as defined by 10 U.S.C. 4872(f)(2), or as designated by the Secretary.
Sec. 8. General Provisions. (a) This order does not impair or affect:
(i) The authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or its head; or
(ii) The functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget related to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order will be implemented in line with applicable laws and subject to available appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to create any legal right or benefit, enforceable at law or equity, by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, entities, officers, employees, or agents.
(d) The Department of War will bear the costs of publishing this order.
DONALD J. TRUMP
THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 20, 2026.
