This marks the fourth installment of my deep dive into Musa al-Gharbi’s We Have Never Been Woke. (Check out Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3 for context).
Al-Gharbi dedicates substantial effort to delineating the demographic profile of those who are most likely to embody the “woke” ethos he critiques. The findings are rather telling: this cohort is predominantly comprised of highly educated white liberals:
This isn’t merely a reflection of broader U.S. population trends; rather, among American workers, symbolic capitalists notably skew white. Almost all of them hold at least a bachelor’s degree. Politically and ideologically, they align overwhelmingly with Democratic and liberal values. In summary, the vast majority of symbolic capitalists are highly educated white liberals, and those who fit this description are statistically likely to fall into the symbolic capitalist camp.
But if this is the current landscape, how did we arrive at this juncture? Al-Gharbi seeks to unravel this by tracing the historical evolution of symbolic professions—their ascent in stature and influence—and how the very forces that propelled their rise shaped the ideologies appealing to this emergent elite.
Though symbolic professions have existed in various forms throughout history, their prominence surged during the tumultuous decades surrounding World War I. The chaos of the time fostered a widespread belief that a fundamental overhaul of civilization was imperative:
Amidst this turmoil, the Progressives emerged. They transformed the social gospel movement, vowing to help America rise above its divisions, redeem its spirit, and usher in an era of unparalleled peace and prosperity through the application of science and rationality—something they believed laissez-faire capitalism could never achieve. They envisioned a world where the excesses of robber barons would be tempered by technocrats, and where corruption, nepotism, exploitation, and discrimination would give way to meritocracy and professionalism. The well-being of the impoverished and the marginalized would be guaranteed through a combination of aid, education initiatives, regulatory expansions, and yes, even eugenics. Political discord, ethnic strife, and other tribalistic conflicts would be resolved by impartial experts dedicated to the public good. Class conflict would dissipate, not because inequality was eradicated, but because society would recognize that the prosperity unleashed by free markets could benefit all—provided the affluent were persuaded to cede a portion of their wealth and authority to symbolic capitalists to oversee the economy and society at large. The emergence of symbolic professions was in service to this grand vision.
As Progressivism solidified its political foothold, the denizens of symbolic professions endeavored to administer its objectives within both public and private sectors. Using their symbolic capital, these capitalists led through expertise, guided by data, and manipulated policy levers to realize their goals. This period saw the professions of the symbolic capitalist class increasingly formalize their practices—take, for instance, Harvard’s establishment of the Harvard Business School, the first institution globally to offer a Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree. Education, too, underwent formalization:
Progressives not only championed the expansion of secondary schools but also successfully lobbied for mandatory attendance laws aimed at assimilating (“civilizing”) ethnic and religious minorities. To cultivate an army of trained instructors capable of educating students in the “correct” manner, teachers’ colleges emerged nationwide, evolving from earlier “normal schools,” while numerous colleges and universities developed departments dedicated to education.
As this new elite arose, they also sought to entrench political power within their grasp:
To validate their roles, augment their salaries, and broaden their influence, they increasingly sought to extricate decisions from the realm of democratic debate, instead recasting them as matters of expert judgment. It would be for them, the self-proclaimed experts, to discern not just what the public desired, but what it ought to desire. They would also decide the optimal methods to realize specific goals and assess progress toward those ends.
This professional formalization was further buttressed by stringent gatekeeping measures designed to keep undesirables out. As members of this new elite seized technocratic power, the establishment ensured that only those with the appropriate symbolic capital could wield such authority:
To guarantee that these positions were filled by the “right” individuals, Woodrow Wilson permitted the exclusion of African Americans from civil service based on race and, following 1914, mandated photographs accompany job applications to facilitate ongoing racial discrimination. Later, under Franklin D. Roosevelt (and to a lesser extent Harry S. Truman), various restrictions were imposed that disqualified immigrants and minorities from accessing New Deal and Fair Deal job opportunities or benefiting from associated wealth-building initiatives.
In the private sector, the new professional class erected barriers to entry through regulatory capture, resulting in a proliferation of licensing and certification requirements, all aimed at keeping out the “wrong” kinds of individuals:
Efforts were made to limit access to journalism jobs to those with professional degrees. Teacher certification requirements skyrocketed. New licensing, testing, certification, and degree prerequisites emerged across fields such as medicine (and its derivatives like dentistry, pharmacology, nursing, and psychiatry), law, social work, and information professions. Scientists in both natural and social sciences increasingly needed advanced degrees to be regarded as credible practitioners. These measures were expressly crafted to ensure that the “right” types of individuals (upper-middle-class WASPs) filled these roles while filtering out the “wrong” types (ethnic and religious minorities). Professional organizations like the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association took steps to restrict membership to whites, denying accreditation to most institutions aimed at training immigrants and minorities in these fields.
Even in cases where the barriers weren’t overtly discriminatory, they were often subtly adjusted to achieve the desired outcomes:
Colleges and universities began awarding scholarships and admissions based on “merit.” However, as soon as too many “undesirables” (like Jewish students) began qualifying for merit-based admissions and aid, institutions transitioned to a “holistic” approach, allowing them to discreetly exclude those who otherwise met academic criteria.
Ultimately, the system of credentialism, licensing, certification, and other entry barriers constructed by the symbolic capitalist class proved tremendously lucrative for them. Referencing the sociologist Randall Collins, al-Gharbi notes (ellipsis included in the original),
Indeed, Collins’s research indicates that while the symbolic professions and the credentialing system were ostensibly introduced to redistribute wealth and opportunity from the elite to the needy, the actual wealth transfer that occurred was predominantly from the upper class to the upper-middle class. Symbolic capitalists took from the wealthy and redistributed…primarily to themselves.
However, while the symbolic professions accrued wealth and power, the foundational purpose of the Progressive movement they championed was meant to improve conditions for the underprivileged. Hence, it becomes crucial for symbolic capitalists to frame their technocratic authority, along with the institutional barriers they erect and sustain to safeguard their status, as being rooted in genuine concern for societal welfare—especially for the impoverished. If they come across as self-serving or shortsighted, serving elite interests at the expense of the general public, or as parasitic rather than beneficial to society, their authority and job security could be jeopardized. This dynamic engenders an arms race within the symbolic professions:
This legitimization process also fosters a unique form of status competition among those in symbolic professions: individuals perceived as more effective or dedicated to promoting the common good—especially in aiding the marginalized and disadvantaged—tend to earn greater prestige, respect, and autonomy. Conversely, those who are successfully depicted as lacking the values, priorities, and behaviors befitting their profession often find their employment and social standing precariously at risk. During challenging times, the symbolic capitalists become even more competitive, striving to showcase that their peers and rivals have historically failed to achieve a state of being woke.
This intense competition gives rise to what are termed “Awokenings.” Although this term has only recently been coined to refer to the “Great Awokening” among symbolic capitalists post-2010, al-Gharbi asserts that it is merely the latest manifestation of a recurring phenomenon. Numerous Awokenings have occurred, all instigated by members of the symbolic professions. However, when al-Gharbi refers to “hard times,” he has a specific type of adversity in mind.
In the upcoming post, we will delve into al-Gharbi’s thesis regarding the conditions that catalyze Awokenings and the factors that ultimately lead to their decline.
